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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis is a critical study of R.M. Hare's recent work "Moral 
Thinking" and an attempt to develop some of the ideas in it. Hare's 
book contains illuminating discussions on many ethical and metaethical 
issues, but two central themes can be isolated. One is his suggestion 
that there are two levels of moral thinking, the critical and the 
intuitive; the other is his detailed argument that preference-utilitarianism 
operates at the most fundamental level of moral thinking, the critical level, 
to ultimately determine what we ought to do.
Hare's argument for utilitarianism will be studied in depth. In particular 
his appeal to linguistic intuitions, his assertion that 'ought' is 
prescriptive and the argument of chapters 5 - 6  of "Moral Thinking" will 
all be assessed, as will his claim that prudence rules out amoralism.
Hare admits that his book leaves some important issues less than fully 
discussed: I attempt to see what implications these have for Hare's
theory. Most of these relate to the concept of 'preference'; in particular 
to the question of whether 'irrational' preference should be excluded.
I also try to see what connection there is between Hare's preference- 
utilitarianism and happiness based theories. These issues are of independent 
interest as they affect the feasibility of preference-utilitarianism in 
general, not just Hare's version of it.
Finally, Hare's suggestion that there are two levels of moral thinking will 
be assessed, as well as his proposal that this allows both for a defence of 
utilitarianism and a reconciliation between it and deontological theories.
Chapter I Introduction
"Moral Thinking" is perhaps first and foremost a continuation of the 
suggestions made in "Freedom and Reason" concerning the constraints 
universalizability and prescriptiveness place on the moral thinker. Hare's 
mature view is that these constraints are so powerful that if we are 
rational we will exercise our freedom to reason in only one way, that 
being in line with preference-utilitarianism. Hare's work is consequently 
to be seen as one of the most detailed and eloquent proofs of utilitarianism. 
But alongside this argument for utilitarianism there runs a significant 
meta-ethical contribution. Hare suggests that there are two levels of moral 
thinking, which are complementary to each other. Hare calls the most 
fundamental level the "critical" level of moral thinking. Critical moral 
thinking requires that the thinker ignores his normative views and makes 
moral judgments in line with the logical properties of moral words and 
the facts of the situation. It is at the critical level that preference- 
utilitarianism operates, and the major part of Hare's book is devoted to 
proving this. But critical thinking presupposes degrees of knowledge, 
free time and impartiality which human beings seldom possess. Paradoxically 
by its own reasoning, too frequent appeals to critical thinking would be 
sub-optimal. It is far better (from the point of view of critical thinking) 
that we are disposed to adhere to intuitive principles of the form: "Do not 
lie": critical thinking is appropriate only when framing these intuitive
principles or when they conflict in a certain situation. Hence much of our 
everyday moral discourse is at the intuitive level. Hare argues that the 
distinction between levels allows for a reconciliation between deontological 
themes and utilitarianism. According to Hare, they are not conflicting 
theories, since they operate at different levels of moral thinking. 
Utilitarians are right in that utility is the ultimate determinant of 
what is right, yet deontolegists are quite correct in urging us not to 
make too facile appeals to utility. "Moral Thinking" is consequently a 
most ambitious work: not only does it aim to show that the rational
moral thinker must be utilitarian, it also traces the source of much 
argument among moral philosophers.
I propose to concentrate on three main themes :
(1) Critical thinking and its derivation, providing Hare's answer to 
"What ought I to do?"
(2) Complications which may arise concerning the concept of preference 
and preference-utilitarianism
(3) The two levels of moral thinking and the consequent reconcilitation 
between utilitarianism and deontological theories.
Summary of the main issues discussed in each section
It will be helpful to have set out in front of us from the outset the 
argument Hare uses to show that the rational moral thinker will be 
utilitarian. Since Hare thinks that it is prudent to do what you ought 
to do, critical thinking also provides the rational answer to the 
question "What shall I do?"
Imagine that I am contemplating what to do in a given situation. The 
following is my interpretation of Hare's argument which is meant to lead 
me to the conclusion that I should act in accordance with preference- 
utilitarianism (which may involve a direct calculation or, more probably, 
the adherence to an intuitive principle derived from preference-utilitarianism)
Hi: If I am prudent I shall do what I ought to do; i.e. amoralism is
ruled out (but on prudential rather than logical grounds). (Moral Thinking 
[MT] XI).
H2: I must frame a moral principle for the situation. There are, however,
two levels of moral thinking, and I must decide what level I am operating on.
If the situation is new to me, or if I find that my intuitive principles 
conflict, then I must do some critical thinking. In any case, critical 
thinking is essential at some stage in each individual's life in order to 
criticise the intuitive principles he finds himself with (MT 2,3).
H3: In order to answer the question: "What ought I to do?" rationally
I must understand the words contained in the question. In particular, I 
must be aware of the logical properties of the word 'ought'. (MT 1 ) .
H4 : An investigation into the logical properties of the moral 'ought'
reveals that it is prescriptive, universalizable and, at the critical level, 
overriding. These features, in conduction with others (H5-H10) will 
constrain moral thinkers in that there will be very many 'ought' statements 
which in any given situation they cannot rationally adhere to.
(Language of Morals, Freedom and Reason, Mt 1 ) .
H5 Rationality requires of us that we know all the facts relating to 
the situation. These include facts about other people's preferences 
(in practice we will not be able to know all the facts, but we must 
attempt to discover all those which are relevant, i.e. affect the outcome ^
of critical moral thinking). (MTV).
H6 If I know that a person whom I may affect prefers with intensity L 
that action A be done (or not be done) then I must know that were I, 
hypothetically to be put in his exact position (including having his 
preferences), I too would prefer that A be done with intensity L.
(MT V ) .
H7: I cannot know that if I were in that position I would prefer that A
be done with intensity L (H6) unless I now prefer with intensity L 
that if, hypothetically, I were in his position A shall be done; 
i.e. H5 and H6 mean that I must now have a preference relating to what 
would happen to me were hypothetically I to be put in the other 
person's shoes (MT V).
H8: By universalization I must make my hypothetical concern for other
people actual, i.e. I must convert my hypothetical preference that 
"were I in his shoes, A should happen" into an actual preference that 
A be done (even though as a matter of fact I am not in his position).
(MT VI ) .
H9: From H7 and H8 it follows that I must have a preference that A be
done (or not be done) corresponding to the preference of all those 
affected by A (including myself). (MT VI).
HlO: By prescriptivity and overridingness (H4) I can say "A ought to
be done" sincerely only if I prefer on balance that A be done. From H9 
it is clear that the only action which I prefer to be done on balance 
will be that prescribed by preference-utilitarianism. (MT VI). Therefore 
my answer to "What shall I do?" will be governed by utilitarianism.
Hll: But an appeal to preference-utilitarianism reveals that, paradoxically,
performing a cost-benefit analysis each time we were contemplating action 
would be self-defeating in that it would nOt lead to maximum preference 
satisfaction. Consequently we must work out for outselves a set of simple 
principles to guide our lives, which in general will maximise preference 
satisfaction. These principles are our intuitive moral principles: only
when they conflict or when we need a new situation should we actually 
undertake critical thinking (MT III).
Section I comprises an appraisal of the above argument HI - Hll.
Chapter II questions Hi: is it really prudent to be moral?
Chapter III questions H3: is Hare's method valid?
Chapter IV looks into H4 and in particular prescriptivity and moral
weakness.
Chapter V examines the rest of the argument in H5 to HlO.
Section II: Complications arising from the application of critical
thinking.
It is by no means obvious what preference-utilitarianism is. Hare alludes 
to but does not enter into a detailed discussion of some of the following 
complications:
(1) what is a preference? - the ambiguity between its being a purely 
behavioural disposition to act and a rational evaluation of what is of 
value.
(2) The relationship between preference - and happiness - versions of 
utilitarianism.
(3) "Irrational" preferences - i.e. preferences which the rational 
agent would not have or would override: should these be excluded?
Section III: The two levels of moral thinking.
Chapters VII and VIII of the present work examine the claim that there 
are two levels of moral thinking and the suggestion that utilitarianism 
and deontological theories are compatible.
Chapter II ^
--------------------  Prudence and Morality
Like many moral philosophers. Hare wants his writings actually to influence 
the way people live. In steps h 2 - Hll (in my presentation of Hare's 
argument, given in Chapter i) Hare demonstrates that if people wish to 
say things like "You ought to do X" , and wish to use language correctly 
and be rational, then they must do so in accordance with what Hare calls 
critical thinking. But before we embark upon an examination of this 
argument, it is worth considering what reasons Hare gives for anyone to 
commit himself to making moral judgments. For Hare's position (quite 
clearly stated in MT 10) is that the logic of the moral concepts only 
get a hold if an agent chooses to use them: thus we are quite free
either to refrain from using the moral words or to use them only to 
make judgments of moral indifference (e.g. "it is not the case that you 
ought to do X"). If Hare left it at that his enterprise would not be 
totally unsuccessful: for assuming that the argument H2 - Hll could be
upheld, then he would at leave have given a correct account of how to 
use 'ought' (and consequently of how to act since 'ought' is prescriptive) 
which would be binding on anyone who wished to be moral. But the question 
arises: what can be said to the rational egoist, the man who wishes to
maximise his own preference-satisfaction? To avoid circularity, whatever 
reason we suggest to him for his taking part in moral discourse must be 
of a non-moral kind: for the choice facing the rational egoist is
either to opt out of morality altogether or to make judgments in 
accordance with critical thinking. In MT 11 Hare contends that on 
grounds of prudence the egoist should reject amoralism.
On the face of it this is a rather surprising claim. Of course it is 
generally agreed that morality pays humanity as a whole, i.e. it is in 
everyone's interest that everyone is moral rather than not. But because 
morality entails each individual making some sacrifices - i.e. on 
occasions undertaking the action which is not in his self interest - 
it is even more preferable, from each individual's point of view, for 
all other people to be moral but for him to act in his own self-interest;
that way he gets the best of both worlds. In order of rpeference the
three possibilities are:
(1) everyone else moral and my always acting selfishly
(2) everyone - including me - being moral
(3) no-one being moral
Consequently so long as my not being moral does not lead to other people 
following likewise [i.e. because of interdependence of choices (1) leading 
to (3)] it is plausible to argue that morality does not pay.
This conclusion would also seem to follow from an application of Hare's 
own theory. Morality - i.e. critical thinking - means weighing the 
individual's own preference with everyone else's and then acting upon 
that judgment which maximises preference-satisfaction overall. Prudence 
can be characterised as involving many different things, but a plausible 
definition which would certainly be favoured by the preference-utilitarian 
would be that it requires maximising the agent's own preference-satisfaction. 
The suggestion that the morally correct act and the prudential act always 
coincide is quite ludicrous. Obviously there are many occasions when my 
preferences do not outwigh the preferences of other people affected by 
my action, and in those situations to be moral I must make some sacrifice. 
Hare could accept this, and his argument for prudence and morality 
coinciding does not rest on the wildly implausible suggestion that the 
right act will always be the one which is in our self-interest. But 
before we go on to consider Hare's argument given in MT 11, it is interesting 
to lock briefly at a few ways in which the results of critical moral 
thinking and critical prudential thinking (i.e. maximising one's own 
preference satisfaction) may be closer than might be thought.
Most importantly, society provides devices which artifically induce one to 
take other people's preferences into account. Thus intrinsically I may 
have no desire whatsoever that Jones's property should not be stolen. 
Consequently were there no legal system, there could be circumstances 
where I would act on my preference to have his property - even though 
his preference to keep his property might be stronger. This is a very 
simple illustration of the way in which prudence and morality may 
conflict. But now suppose that a law is introduced whereby I am severely 
punished should I steal Jones's property. It may well be that my 
preference to avoid punishment is stronger than mine for his property, 
and so I do not steal it. In this case the law has led to my doing the 
morally correct action: but not because I have taken other people's
preferences into account, but rather because institutions exist which 
ensure that my own (selfish) preferences are adversely affected should 
I undertake actions which lead to other people's dissatisfaction. Note 
that it is not only the law that has this effect: praise, blame and
social acceptance or disgrace widen the network of this process. But 
still it must be rather limited. The law may punish my taking Jones's 
property but it does not touch me if I hurt his feelings in some other 
way. Selfish behaviour is an infinitely wider class of behaviour than 
criminal behaviour: neither is it the case that all selfishness is
socially disapproved of (if discovered). Neither would it be true to 
say that the laws of this land or established social mores always provide
prudential reasons for following Hare's particular moral system. For 
instance, it may well be that critical thinking requires of us that we 
do not keep those who are suffering alive if it is against their wishes 
(Hare himself cites this case in MT 10). But in this example not only 
is it not true that society provides reasons for acting morally, on the 
contrary it actually imposes additional reasons for acting immorally 
(if Hare's morality is the correct one). So to the extent that critical 
thinking is at odds with conventional morality the effect described above 
actually works in reverse. We are undoubtedly very far from the position 
we would be in were we to have certain knowledge that we were to be 
punished in the afterlife in exact proportion to the moral crimes we 
commit in this life.
A second way in which prudence and morality may converge arises if one 
considers different types of preferences (or desires). Many of our 
preferences - especially those for pleasurable experiences - are essentially 
self-regarding in that they centre upon our own experiences. Others, 
such as those for the well-being of other members of one's family, are 
other-regarding desires. It is notoriously difficult to characterise 
the exact difference between these two categories of desires (or 
preferences). Intuitively it is, I take it, uncontroversial to say that 
some desires are self-regarding whereas others are not: indeed we use
such terms as "self-centred" to describe people who only care about what 
happens to themselves. But the obvious definition - i.e. that self- 
regarding desires are ones which if satisfied increase our own well­
being - fails because in a sense we get something out of all our 
preferences being satisfied; e.g. although my preference that a friend 
of mine should get the job he wants is other-regarding, on the proposed 
definition it would count as self-regarding, since if it is satisfied 
one of my preferences is satisfied and I will probably feel good about 
his getting the job (i.e. it will increase my level of preference 
satisfaction). Brandt (A Theory of the Good and the Right) suggests 
that self-regarding preferences are those which cannot be fulfilled 
unless we exist. On this basis my desire for my friend to get a job 
clearly counts as other-regarding, which it should. Whilst this definition 
may have some counter-examples it will serve us in our discussion.
The relevance of this distinction may not be immediately obvious. My 
point is simply that the existence of other-regarding desires might 
lessen the divergence between morality and prudence. Imagine two 
worlds : one in which people have only self-regarding desires (WS)
and another where they have both types (WB). Consider the example 
previously alluded to of my contemplating stealing Jones's property.
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In WS I would never have an intrinsic perference for Jones to keep his 
property (since this is an other-regarding desire): if I refrained
from theft it would be because my preference to steal is outweighed by 
the adverse side-effects. In WB though there is the possibility of my 
refraining from theft even if there are no adverse side effects and I 
have a preference to steal his property, I can have the other-regarding 
preference that Jones should keep his property. I could have come to 
have this preference in a number of ways: Jones could be a friend of
mine, in which case I could have the preference that he specifically should 
retain what is his. Alternatively, I could have what Hare would call the 
universal desire that everyone in this sort of position should keep their 
property. Quite clearly then there are a variety of different types of 
other-regarding desires, ranging from moral desires to desires for the 
well-being of our family and friends. We can even imagine a third world 
(Wo) where everyone has overriding universal preferences, i.e. in 
every situation what everyone cares about most is what they feel about 
what shall be done in the situation in general, regardless of the role 
they have. Were our world like this then there would be a complete 
convergence of morality and prudence: for critical thinking requires
the maximal satisfaction of preferences and in Wo each individual's 
preferences already mirror the outcome of critical thinking.
Three considerations limit the practical impact of other-regarding 
desires on the question of whether it is prudent to be moral. Most 
obviously, the world is not like Wl: indeed it resembles WS more than
Wo. Many of our strongest desires are for our own experiences, and 
these may well conflict with other people's preferences. Secondly, there 
is the not remote possibility that our other-regarding desires do not 
exactly match other people's self-regarding desires. In my example my 
desire that Jones should not have his property stolen precisely mirrored 
his own desire. But in the world as it is there is no reason why it should 
be exactly the same strength: more seriously there is the distinct
possibility that it may even go against his own desire. This is quite 
common in the parent-child situation. Here the parent cares about his 
child but it certainly is not always the case that he wishes him to do 
exactly what the child himself wants. There is also the possibility of 
malevolent other-regarding desires. So although the existence of other 
regarding desires introduces the possibility of prudence and morality 
converging, in reality it may have the opposite effect. More seriously 
still, it might be suggested that it is prudent to maximise the satisfaction 
only of self-regarding desires, i.e. preferences for others' well-being 
should be excluded from the calculations of what is in our own interests.
I think our intuitions run two ways here. Certainly with moral desires
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e.g. a man's desire that a certain war should end - it would be odd to 
suggest that it was prudent for him to take measures which would 
increase the probability of its ending. (Though in a sense he would 
benefit since a preference of his would be satisfied). Yet with some 
other-regarding desires - e.g. a desire that one's family should flourish - 
it would be equally odd to say that one's happiness would not increase 
by the desire being satisfied. Clearly there is much room for debate 
over where the line should be drawn exactly, but it would at any rate 
seem fairly safe to conclude that the satisfaction of some, but by no 
means all, other-regarding desires would normally be thought of as 
contributing to a person's happiness (or self-interest).
A third route by which morality and prudence can coincide is when my 
taking what appears to be the self-interested course of action leads
to others doing likewise, the result being that I would in fact have
been better off being moral. Recall that my brief argument for the 
divergence between morality and prudence at the start of this chapter 
rested on the contrary assumption: i.e. my taking option (1); me
self-interested, others moral, did not lead to option (3): everyone being 
self-interested. Whilst in general this assumption may be valid - for 
instance whether or not I pay my taxes to the full does not affect whether 
the other fifty million citizens of this country do - in certain instances 
a degree of interdependence can exist. The natural example that comes 
to mind is of truth-telling: in a particular situation it may appear
in my interest to lie, but it may be that the person to whom I lie may
discover my deceit and do likewise to me in a similar situation (note 
that this example differs from the more complex circumstance of there 
being no chance of discovery, when it is still arguable that in some 
way it is prudent to tell the truth, because of the subtle effects on 
the intitution of truth-telling). Another exmaple might arise in a 
mutually profitable relationship between a journalist and a politician.
It may appear to be in the journalist's interest to publish an exclusive 
account of the scandal the politician has told him about "off the record". 
However, this course of action would breach the trust between the two 
and would result in the politician withholding such information in the 
future. Consequently it is in the journalist's enlightened self- 
interest to keep his bargain with the politician. This sort of situation 
is probably quite common : a breach of an understanding is in both
parties' interests if the other does not find out, but as he will, 
both parties sacrifice their immediate interests to get the second- 
best option of keeping the agreement rather than the worst (least 
preferred) option where both breach the agreement. But there must also 
be plenty of cases where detection is not likely and equally as many
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where the agreement has precious little to do with morality, i.e. whilst 
it certainly can be the case that option (2) is the morally preferred 
option, there is no necessity that it is (the agreement could be between 
thieves or it could be in the public interest that the scandal the 
politician wants hushed up is instead exposed).
Despite the qualifications required, though, these three factors do at least 
show that enlightened self-interest may be closer to morality than might 
appear to be the case. To recap on the positions, it may help to consider 
a particular example. Imagine I am considering breaking a promise. The 
common^sense appraisal of the situation might be that this would be prudent 
but not moral: for we are to imagine that there are considerable
advantages which accrue to me should I break the promise. But consider the 
five ways in which even here morality and prudence could coincide.
(1) Other people's preferences could be in line with mine, i.e. no-one 
minds if I break the promise. Since critical thinking says that the 
morally required action is that which leads to maximum preference- 
satisf act ion , obviously both morality and prudence require that I break 
the promise.
(2) Others might object to my breaking the promise, but my preference could 
be stronger than theirs. Again, critical thinking would recommend 
doing the self-interested action.
(1) and (2) are ways in which the moral act may turn out to be the self- 
interested one too. (3) - (5) are the three routes by which the reverse 
happens, i.e. the morally correct act is also in my enlightened self-interest.
(3) Others object to ray breaking the promise, and because of this my 
other preferences will be adversely affected if I break the promise, 
e.g. the law may be used against me or I may be shunned socially.
It may well be that the net effect of breaking the promise is that 
my total preference-satisfaction would be reduced compared to keepting 
it.
(4) Although I want to break the promise, I also care about the welfare
of the person it will adversely affect, or possibly about the upholding 
of promise-keeping in general. It is quite possible that my other- 
regarding preferences outweigh my self-regarding ones to break the 
promise.
(5) My breaking the promise would affect the way the person affected 
treated me: it might turn a mutually profitable relationship. It is 
consequently in my enlightened self-interest to keep the promise.
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It would be ludicrous to argue that the moral act and the prudent act 
are never the same. But it would be equally ludicrous to suggest that 
they are always the same; (1) - (5) do not apply to all situations by any 
means. But if this is the case, why cannot the rational egoist pick and 
choose when to be moral, i.e. to breach morality whenever it was in his 
interests to do so?
Hare's answer rests on an assumption concerning human capabilities. He 
admits that an omniscient, omnipotent arch-demon would do exactly this.
But he suggests that we humans cannot do a cost-benefit analysis on each 
situation, and if we did we would very likely get it wrong. We must each 
of us act on whatever dispositions we have: if we are moral we will tend
to do the moral act and if not then we will do the self-interested act.
So we have the choice of whether to be either generally moral or generally 
self-interested: Hare argues that, paradoxically, the former is the
prudent course of action.
Hare sets out his argument for this conclusion on pages 194-198 of MT.
His first argument rests on the suggestion that "crime does not pay" and so 
resembles my argument (3). As has been argued, this is of limited use to 
Hare, since there are plenty of immoral actions which are neither illegal 
nor subject to the disapproval of society. Hare's main argument is put 
by means of considering what principles (i.e. dispostions of character) 
we would make a child have if we were solely interested in his well-being. 
According to Hare we would inculcate in him the prima facie moral 
principles recommended by critical thinking. Unfortunately he does not 
give very many reasons for this conclusion, apart from his suggestion 
that crime does not pay and that "those who do not love their fellow men 
are less successful in living happily amongst them." Also he suggests 
that it is impossible to be selective about when to be moral if one 
cannot have a disposition to follow the principles only to the extent 
that they are required for the approval of society.
Of course it is an empirical question how good Hare's arguments are.
But it seems to me that they are not very plausible. To be sure, if we
were bringing up a child with only his interests in mind we would not 
mould him into being a criminal; but the gap between criminality and 
immorality is a large one. It is my guess that we would, as Hare suggests, 
try to make him obey the law and not do things society disapproves of 
in general. We might also teach him to be loyal to friends and family 
as otherwise, as Hare would argue, he would miss out on any decent 
relationships. But this is all a very long way from him having the 
moral principles suggested by critical thinking. It seems to me that 
human nature is such that we are very prone to being very "moral"
to some members of our country, or race, or community, whilst the reverse
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to outsiders. Our model child would probably be best served doing 
likewise; he would be kind to his family and friends, but if we 
really wanted to maximise his well-being we would not instil in him 
the disposition to risk his life to help a stranger.
It has to be admitted that my objections to Hare cannot be regarded as 
conclusive since they rest on unverified opinions on empirical matters.
But on the face of it, it would be rather surprising if the principles 
recommended by critical thinking were identical with those of critical 
prudential thinking. This is particularly the case when one remembers 
that utilitarianism is in two separate ways quite a demanding moral code. 
ThLe first reason has already been alluded to: namely that obeying it will
bring social disapproval since our conventional morality is certainly 
not completely utilitarian. The other reason is that utilitarianism, 
more I think than any other moral codes, requires an unusual degree of 
self-sacrifice. Utilitarianism demands at once that one must sacrifice any 
amount of one's onw happiness - perhaps even one's life - if by so doing 
one adds to the total amount of happiness in the world. Other ethical 
theories differ in that many would distinguish between its being morally 
praiseworthy and obligatory to make such a sacrifice, and would also 
suggest that not all people have the right to make claims on you.
Hare deals with similar points towards the end of MT 11 when he argues 
that acts of supererogation would not be required by critical thinking.
But his argument here is not particularly persuasive. He suggests that 
only those with a "vocation" for doing saintly deeds should undertake 
them. The idea is that if we set the standards of morality too high, 
too many people would opt out of morality. This is perhaps plausible 
if one is going to hand over a set of intuitive principles to someone on 
an all-or-nothing basis, i.e. the receiver of the principles is what 
Hare terms a "prole" who can do no critical thinking and who either 
practise all of morality or give it up altogether. But in the case of 
someone who can do his own critical thinking such a danger is not 
present. If, for example, giving 50% of my money to charity is the 
morally correct act, how is it allowable that I should not do it? It 
seems but a small step from someone saying that he has no "vocation" for 
such deeds, even if he should do it, to saying that he has no "vocation" 
for basic moral acts like truth-telling.
This, however, is not the place for detailed argument concerning the amount 
of self-sacrifice required by utilitarianism; it is obvious that it 
requires more than a Nozick-type ethical system ascribing negative rights 
to others. The question is, then, why not inculcate your child with 
a less demanding moral code that utilitarianism, preferably one which 
is in line with conventional morality? I do not see that Hare had
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any arguments which will show than on prudential grounds utilitarianism 
is preferable.
So far I have taken it for granted that Hare is arguing for it actually 
being in someone's interests to be a utilitarian rather than immoral, 
amoral, or follow an alternative moral code. Such is certainly the 
impression one obtains from MI 11. But in the context of the main 
argument. Hi - Hll, Hare need not make such a bold claim. For all he has 
to do is to show it is better than amoralism: the other two alternatives
are ruled out on logical grounds. That is, granted that the rest of the 
argument - H2-H11 - is correct, one cannot adopt another moral code
yet still use words like 'ought', since the logical properties of 'ought' 
constrain one to make utilitarian prescriptions. Nor can one be self- 
confessedly immoral yet maintain that one is using the moral words 
properly. It is interesting to see here a possible conflict in the dictates 
of rationality-. Hare maintains (MT p.2): that if we are to be rational 
we must understand the words we use, when we ask ."What ought I to do?" and 
will (MT p.7) "if we are rational, exercise our freedom (to reason) in 
only one way". In other words once we pose the question "What ought 
I to do?" it is rationality which requires us to do the utilitarian act.
Yet at the same time it is generally accepted that it is rational to act
prudently. But in view of the preceding argument it may well be prudent
to be immoral. A good example is that it may well be prudent not to
pay in full one's income tax, i.e. to understate one's earnings. Particularly
amongst the self-employed this is general practice and it is not subject
to social condemnation: moreover, the risk of detection is slight and
the benefit quite large.
The tax dodger will not - if H2 -Hll is correct - be rational, in the 
sense that he will not be doing what he morally ought to do; if he claims 
he is doing what is morally right then Hare can throw rationality via 
following the logic of the moral concepts at him. Yet what he does 
provides a correct answer to the different question: "What prudentially
ought I rationally to do?" indeed it is arguable that the moral act is 
irrational from a prudential point of view. Rationality provides 
different answers because the questions being posed are different: the
answer to "What rationally ought I prudentially to do?" Hare cannot say, 
then that rationality is on his side in his deba^with the rational 
egoist who is contemplating whether or not to be moral.
In view of considerations such as those. Hare never claims that rationality 
or logic alone compel anyone to be moral. Only if the agent wishes to make 
a moral judgment does rationality ensure that he issues utilitarian 
prescriptions. But even if someone does want to be moral it is arguable
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that this bears the price of acting irrationally in the sense that it 
requires imprudence,. For as we have seen, the self-interested agent 
will ensure that he has the dispositions required by critical prudential 
thinking rather than critical moral thinking. It seems likely that 
critical prudential thinking will not lead one to be totally immoral or 
criminal (the routes which we saw led to some convergence of morality 
and prudence ensure this) but will adhere to conventional morality, be 
non-self-centred enough to strike up proper relationships, but not make 
the sacrifices required by Utilitarianism.
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Chapter III Hare's Method: Appeal to Linguistic Intuitions
If the argument of the previous chapter is correct then Hare cannot claim 
that on grounds of prudence alone a man should act as prescribed by 
critical thinking: though the more limited proposal that logic and
prudence.in tandem make it rational to do so is possibly more defensible. 
In any case we have as yet done nothing to dampen what would be for Hare 
a more important assertion, namely that critical thinking provides a 
rational way of determining what one (morally) ought to do, assuming 
that one wants to do the morally correct act. For Hare could quite 
rightly point out not only that the majority of people do at least claim 
that they are doing the right thing and besides that it is the main task 
of the moral philospher to analyse our moral concepts and that it is 
only a secondary - though highly desirable purpose - to actually have 
some effect on the way people live. For the remainder of Section I we 
will therefore consider whether Hare succeeds in this task, i.e. 
whether Hi -Hll succeed in establishing that critical thinking is the 
rational way to answer moral questions.
The most fundamental premise of the whole argument is that the way to 
make progress in moral philosophy is to analyse the moral concepts and 
that discovering their logical properties will enable one to lay down 
restrictions on the way moral words can be used. The key assumption of 
MT - i.e. that the logical properties of the moral concepts are, in 
harness, so powerful that they constrain all moral thinkers to be 
unanimous in their approval of a situation: unanimous if they are
fully informed, rational, and using the moral words correctly. The great 
attraction of Hare's system is that moral conclusions are arrived at 
which are in a sense both objective and rational without anything being 
appealed to but the logic of the moral concepts. In particular, at no 
stage does Hare feed into the argument his own moral beliefs. Nowhere 
does he say anything like "It is self-evident that preferences are morally 
relevant", nor that anyone brought up properly could not fail to see 
that justice is less important than preference-satisfaction. It is quite 
possible that Hare has these moral intuitions but his point would be that 
they should be regarded precisely as these - i.e. they belong to the 
intuitive level of moral thinking, and are therefore in need of 
justification via critical thinking. It may well be that preference- 
satisfaction is morally relevant, but Hare's position is that this 
should be the output rather than the input of a moral system. Only 
formal consideraitons (i.e. the logic of the moral concepts) should be 
relied upon: substantial moral judgments are ruled out for purposes of
justifying a moral system.
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Hare's method holds an attraction proportionate to the defects of 
its competitors. Relying on the plausibility of moral judgments is 
unsatisfactory, partly because, by the nature of the subject, they 
cannot be proved or even tested in any conclusive way. Ultimate moral 
principles, by virtue of their being ultimate, admit of no proof and 
appear to be simply a matter of irrational choice. To be sure one can 
test out our moral principles for consistency with each other and can in 
some Rawlsian sense arrive at a "reflective equilibrium" after rejecting 
those which can be rejected at least cost to our initial moral system; 
but there is no guarantee that these principles will not conflict with 
that arrived at by another person. Such an approach encourages subjectivism 
as a meta-ethical theory or even relativism, since it is arguable that 
different cultures produce different sets of principles about which 
final arbitration is impossible. The real problem with relying on moral 
intuitions is not just that there is no accepted decision procedure for 
determining the correct intuitions, but it is also difficult to see what 
such a decision procedure could be. Any moral philosopher who, like 
Rawls, relies on the reader agreeing with his moral intuitions rung the 
risk of him not doing so, in which case the whole work becomes futile.
It is not so much that a writer like Rawls has not good enough arguments 
to convince someone that his moral intuitions are wrong: it is rather
that rational argument about such things is not really possible.
In contrast Hare would claim that his method has all the merits of any 
scientific empirical study. For his method involves investigating the 
logical properties of the moral concepts, a task concerning which rational 
agreement certainly should be possible. Hare is not alone in rejecting 
an appeal to moral intuitions : indeed his position has marked affinities
with descriptivism. Descriptivists are those who, like Hare, think that 
a study of the moral concepts is essential but who, unlike Hare, think 
that a straightforward account of their meaning in terms of what facts 
they state can be given. Hare cites Mrs. Foot as a contemporary 
descriptivist. Mill would have been had Moore's account of him been correct 
and Moore himself would be if we take it that he thought 'good' referred to 
some non-natural indefinable property. The typical descriptivist approach 
(Moore as a non-naturalist would be an exception) when studying the moral 
concept 'X' is to give an account of 'X' in terms of some other concepts 
'Y' and 'Z' and the claim that to say something is 'X' is, let us say, 
to state that it has properties 'Y' and 'Z'. Consequently the way forward 
in moral philosophy is to give definitions of the moral words (where 
possible in terms of non-moral words); then it will be relatively 
straightforward to answer questions containing that moral concept.
For instance a descriptivist might suggest that 'good' simply means
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"productive of pleasure", in which case it will be comparatively an 
easy task to determine whether something is good.
Hare’s quarrel with descriptivists is not in their reliance on the 
analysis of language, which he goes along with, but rather in their over- 
simple account of the meaning of the moral words. Hare does not think 
that moral judgments state facts at all, rather they prescribe courses 
of action: hence any attempt to say that 'good' means 'has property X'
is foredoomed. In MT4 Hare provides a strong argument for rejecting 
descriptivism. He admits that with some moral words - which he calls 
"secondary evaluative terms" - descriptivism is fairly plausible. This 
is because evaluative terms contain both a descriptive and a prescriptive 
element, and with some words - like rude, cruel and courageous - the 
descriptive element is relatively well-established. It is plausible 
to maintain both that if one says that an action is cruel one is 
evaluating it adversely and also that certain actions necessarily and 
uncontroversially qualify as being cruel. From these two facts it is 
tempting to conclude that, with these words at least, the descriptivists 
succeed in reaching an evaluative conclusion from purely non-evaluative 
statements of fact, i.e. from the fact that action X 3as such-and-such, 
it indisputably follows that it was cruel, which implies that it ought not 
to be done. Descriptivists claim that having derived an 'ought' from an 
they have succeeded in their intention of using the meaning of words 
to determine what is morally correct.
Hare's objection is that although 'seconday evaluative terms' which 
combine a definitive type of action or trait of character with approval 
or disapproval of it do exist, if one does not agree with the normative 
overtones of the word there is always the option of not using it. That 
is, it may be that if someone does X he must be courageous (or industrious, 
lazy, just, etc.) and that if I call him courageous I am necessarily 
commending him. But, quite simply, if I don't want to commend him 
all I have to do is to refrain from using the word "courageous" in 
these circumstances. I have the option of using evaluatively neutral 
language instead.
Hare states the objection neatly when he points out (MT p.19) that with 
any of these secondary evaluative words we can always ask "Granted that 
it would be X (i.e. cruel, lazy, etc.) would it be wrong?" Now although 
Hare does not distinguish them it is most important to see that this 
objection succeeds for two reasons. One reason is that these words are 
somewhat specific, i.e. one may be appraising only one aspect of the 
situation. For example, even if I admit that an act was courageous, I 
can still answer "No" to the question "Was it the right action?" if there 
are other features of it which would (in my view) merit condemnation.
________
In other words the pro-attitude I express implicitly carries with it 
a ceteris-paribus clause. If an act is both courageous and treacherous 
I am not committed to either of the views that it is right or wrong.
The upshot of all this should be obvious : the descriptivist ' s attempt
to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' fails because the evaluation is not 
as general as an 'ought' statement is.
The second objection to the descriptivist is more fundamental. This is 
the possibility of the moral reformer; the man who agrees that the act 
satisfies the descriptive criteria for being (e.g.) courageous, but does 
not concur with even the view that it ought to be done ceteris paribus: 
he may think its being courageous a matter for moral disapprobation, or 
may think that it is not morally relevant at all. This man - the moral 
reformer - is, according to Hare, not committed to evaluating the 
action favourably merely by the existence in the English language of 
the word courageous. He is quite at liberty to refrain from saying 
"He is courageous" (which would imply "he ought (ceteris paribus) to 
have done it") and instead say something like "He faced danger willingly 
but it is not the case that he ought to have done it") (even ceteris 
paribus). As moral reform takes place in society as a whole, this is 
reflected by the falling into obsolescence of some of these evaluative 
words. For example, the terms "chaste" or "chivalrous" becoming rare 
owes its cause not only to the condition or acts they describe becoming 
correspondingly rare (though this is also a contributory factor): even
when they do occur people don't use these words because they do not want 
to express their approval. The consequence is that the descriptivists' 
efforts are wasted, since even if they could show that a very general moral 
word like 'ought' had some definite equivalent (like 'productive of 
most happiness') it would always be possible for the moral reformer not 
to use 'ought' but to turn to some alternative world of moral approval.
All this may appear to be in Hare's favour. We have so far argued 
against the two alternative methods: an appeal to moral intuitions, and
the descriptivists' attemps to state the meaning of the moral words. But 
then the suspicion grows that what Hare is trying to do is not all that 
different from the descriptivists, so why should he be immune from the 
arguments he uses against them? After all, both he and the descriptivists 
take it that language is somehow binding in that discovering its meaning 
(or in Hare's case its logical properties) constrains us in what 
evaluations we can make. Hare says that his method is more sophisticated, 
in that he both allows the amoralist escape route (whereby one is free
to say "It is not the case that I ought to do .........") and uses the
combined logical properties of the moral words to constrain the agent
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rather than some suggested synonym. But it is interesting to see how 
Hare fares when we turn his own objections to descriptivism against 
his own methods.
Obviously the first objection, that words like 'courageous' are not 
sufficiently general and so generate only ceteris-paribus 'ought' 
statements is irrelevant when we consider 'ought' statements themselves. 
But the possibility of the moral reformer seems to pose as great a 
difficulty for Hare as it does for the descriptivist. If we are free 
not to use the word 'courageous' if we do not want to give our moral 
approval to people who face danger willingly, why exactly cannot we do 
the same with 'ought' if we do not think that preference-satisfaction 
is the fundamental source of value? Even were it the case that 'ought' 
was almost unanimously acknowledged to be universalisable and prescriptive 
and to consequently commit the user to preference-utilitarianism, would 
not the moral reformer refrain from using 'ought' and use alternative 
moral words? (and perhaps use 'ought' in the inverted commas sense that 
whilst an action maximises preference-satisfaction he does not endorse 
it.)
In Freedom and Reason (pp 200-201) Hare counters the suggestion by 
arguing that whilst the man who disapproves of courage can flee to the 
more general word 'ought', the man described in the last paragraph has 
no such option. But once we have separated out the two reasons why 
'ought' does not follow from 'is' we can see that this argument is not 
conclusive. On the basis of his own argument. Hare needs to allow for
the possibility of the moral reformer. Now it may be that a particular
society's language had no alternative general moral word other than 
'ought'. But then why should the agent not invent a new word, or use 
some expression like "the morally right act"?
But perhaps Hare could reply that for a particular society the logical 
properties or meaning of the central moral word - i.e. 'ought' - defines 
what is to count as being moral, i.e. the word 'moral' itself only gets 
its meaning from the moral words. If this claim could be sustained 
then Hare could say that there would be no room for someone to disagree 
with an 'ought' statement based on critical thinking and yet still to 
be able to claim he was being moral. The trouble with this claim is that 
it seems arbitrarily to tie the meaning of "morality" down to the use of 
a moral concept one particular society happens to have. Even if (as
we are granting for the sake of argument) 'ought' as used in our
society is universalisable and prescriptive, we have no right to 
suppose that all societies will have identical words with identical 
logical properties. Hare's method might give normative conclusions he 
likes in our society, but he might not be quite so happy with those
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that would result from an analysis of other possible societies' 
moral concepts.
In order to see this the following "1984" type fable might be of some 
assistance: imagine that a totalitarian regime is established at some
future time in Britain, which sets out to control its subjects' lives. 
Naturally it is frequently making pronouncements like "You ought to do 
X" and "You ought to do Y", where 'X' and 'Y' reflect the State's values. 
Furthermore, suppose that the regime is entirely successful; through 
its propaganda machine it eventually has all its citizens believing that
the state is the sole purveyor of wisdom and should be the ultimate
authority on how the people should conduct their lives.
What would Hare's method tell us about what we ought to do in such a 
society? Admittedly Hare would eschew direct appeal to moral intuitions - 
which would have told us that we ought to do X and Y, where these are the 
acts ordained by the State. Hare's method would be to test the various 
hypothesis about the use of the word 'ought'. For example, to test 
whether a suggested word or phrase was a synonym for 'ought' one would 
see whether asserting that it was the case that it was not Z (where Z is 
the suggested synonym for 'ought') leads to self-contradiction in the 
way in which it is self-contradiction to say "There are a dozen eggs in 
this basket, but there are not twelve". Now it may be that in our
imagined society "You ought to do it, though it is forbidden by the state"
meets with the same reaction - i.e. the citizens linguistic intuitions 
might well tell them that this statement amounts to self-contradiction.
If this were so Hare will have no option but to conclude that' 'ought' 
meant 'recommended by the state'.
What would have happened in this society would be that the belief in the 
State's moral authority is so well entrenched that its language has 
come to embody this belief. Language is to some extent fluid: people
have associated "X being right" with "X being recommended by the state" 
so frequently that the latter in time becomes the descriptive meaning of 
" being right".
It is not difficult to see what the effect of claiming that the central 
moral word of a society constitutes its morality would be in this 
society. Since 'ought' means 'prescribed by the state' anyone who 
disagreed with the state would be labelled immoral (or amoral). The 
effect would consequently be merely to endorse the moral practices of 
that society and rule out the possibility of the moral reformer. I am 
quite sure that Hare would not want to admit that linguistic analysis 
would endorse the conventional morality in the 1984 morality: but I
find it difficult to give any convincing reasons as to why it should
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do anything else. After all it is meant to be a virtue of Hare's method 
that it is a scientific enquiry into the logical properties of words 
and takes no account of our moral prejudices. But if this society existed 
it would be our moral prejudices rather than empirical research which 
would inform us that we ought not to do what the state told us to do. 
Perhaps Hare could claim that in the "1984" society the moral language 
had become perverted. On page 15 (MT) he does indeed say that he is 
"convinced that our ordinary moral concepts are serviceable". But what 
criteria can one use in assessing the moral concepts one already had?
One wants to say something like "It would be best to use 'ought' in our 
sense", but assuming that this is a moral 'best' and that there is an 
intimate link between 'ought' and 'best', then this appraisal would 
appear somewhat circular. We would be appraising our own concepts in 
terms of themselves: compare those in the "1984" society saying that
by their own concepts they ought to use their sense of 'ought' rather 
than ours.
Of course 'serviceable' can mean something other than "the concepts we 
morally ought to have". There are a number of ways in which moral concepts 
could be criticised. They could become so vague or confused that no-one 
knew precisely what was meant by them (as McIntyre argues that our 
present concepts actually are in "After Virtue"). Or they may rest on 
false factual beliefs. Or it could be that some concept a society has 
is so alien from what we understand by a moral concept that it cannot 
be called moral. But there are very many different sets of moral concepts 
which could survive all these tests: very likely those of the "1984"-
society could. So to say that our present concepts are serviceable 
hardly provides conclusive reasons for accepting them. But then again it 
is difficult to see what sort of reasons could be given for accepting 
(or rejecting) them, other than those just given. One suspects that 
the reason Hare thinks our concepts (as he describes them) are serviceable 
is that he finds himself in broad agreement with the normative results 
of linguistic analysis on them. But this is nothing but a moral intuition, 
which is of course inadmissible. If Hare has to say that linguistic 
analysis is justifiable in our society but not in the "1984" society, 
because in the "1984" society the moral concepts they have are not 
conducive to human flourishing, then the whole operation would become 
pointless. For then his system would ultimately rest on the moral 
intuition that human flourishing was what matters - and the whole 
point of linguistic analysis is to avoid having to base a system on 
moral intuitions.
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Hare does give another defence for his method in MT page 18. He says 
"We come into moral philosophy asking certain moral questions, and the 
questions are posed in certain concepts, if we go on trying to answer 
those questions we are stuck with those concepts."
My objection is that had Hare been brought up in the "1984" society he 
would, on this line of reasoning, have to be satisfied with his investigations 
concluded that 'ought' meant 'prescribed by the state'. It is also 
arguable whether or not "What I ought to do?" is the only question of 
moral importance. There are also the questions "What rights have I?" 
and "What is the just action?" But on his own terms Hare has a good 
defence against this argument, namely that these concepts apply only at 
the intuitive level or moral thinking and are to be determined by critical 
thinking (which asks the question "What ought I to do?").
The possibility of the moral reformer seems to pose a serious threat 
to Hare's project. Even if 'ought' is both universalisable and 
prescriptive and the rest of Hare's argument is sound, there remains 
the further question of why anyone should accept the concept as he finds it, 
any more than one has to use the word ' courageous ' just because it exists 
in English. Any temptation to suggest that moral reform is possible with
'courageous' but not 'ought' should be resisted if my "1984" example is
taken into account, for in this scenario moral reform would seem, to us, 
highly desirable. But given that there are a number of different, 
alternative moral concepts we could use, just how do we determine which 
is best? Once we have filtered out the inconsistent and incoherent, 
only our moral intuitions can tell us what to use, e.g. whether to use 
the language of rights or the language of 'ought' or the language of
some 'ought' in an imaginary society. Yet appeal to moral intuitions
is inadmissible: consequently it would seem that there is no valid method
of choosing between different sets of concepts. So it would seem that 
in the final analysis appeal to linguistic intuitions gets us no further 
and appeal to moral intuitions.
But perhaps there is one last defence Hare can make. The assumption 
has been made that there exist (or could exist) many conflicting 
sets of moral concepts each of which will, after linguistic analysis, 
generate different normative conclusions. To what extent different 
cultures actually do produce different moral concepts (all of which 
are still somehow recognisably moral) is an empirical question 
which I am not able to answer. But in our own society we have enough 
moral concepts which, if they do not actually conflict, at the very least 
stresé different mspects of 'ought', rights, the virtues, justice. On the 
face of it McIntyre's argument that we have a vast array of concepts
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with different origins is very plausible. But it may well be that 
Hare would dispute this claim; certainly he would argue that 'ought* 
is in some way the most fundamental of our moral concepts. By so doing 
he would evade the previous argument: if he could maintain that any 
moral concept had to be (or to he derived from) universalisability and 
prescriptivity then it would follow that no competing concept would 
count as moral. There is evidence that Hare holds this view. In MT 
(p.187) he says:-
"I can dispute with (Homer ^ d  Aristotle) and with Nietzche if 
they are prepared to offer some affirmative universal prescription 
(as no doubt they would be)", 
i.e. he thinks that even the above thinkers, who certainly used different 
concepts from our own, would, in making moral judgments, make universal 
prescriptions. More directly in Freedom and Reason (p.201), he says:
"If a man wants to flee from my concepts, where is he going to 
fleet to? To singular prescriptions expressing selfish desires?"
But is the view that universalisability and prescriptivity are both 
unanimously agreed upon necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
judgment being moral very plausible? Although argument about such a 
matter is not easy to decide, it is my guess that Hare's claim - if
this is his view - is wrong. To begin with, note that Hare contrasts
universalisable prescriptions with selfish ones. But a non-universalisable 
prescription need not be selfish; anyone might be prepared to make a 
sacrifice oneself, but not necessarily say that everyone in the same 
position as you ought to. Equally, although we would normally say that 
one should have some inclination towards doing what we think is right, 
prescriptivity is hardly uncontroversial in claiming that we must 
actually, ceteris paribus, do it given the opportunity: much more will be
said on this in the next chapter. My point is simply that whether or 
not 'ought' is universalis able and prescriptive this is hardly obvious 
and uncontroversial claim it would surely be were this defence to succeed.
It would seem that Hare would be legislating were he to insist that
the term 'moral' be confined to universal prescriptions. It would be 
more in line with common parlance to call a judgment moral if it is 
non-self-interested and seriously affects interest or rights of others.
Hare would be mistaken on empirical grounds if he claimed that all 
concepts which have been thought at some time by some people to be moral 
have been prescriptive and universalisable, e.g. moral terms as employed 
by existentialists.
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It would be a little unfair to suggest that these considerations count 
only against Hare. If I am right then appeal to neither linguistic nor 
moral intuitions has any final authority. Consequently it is difficult 
to see how any moral philosopher can make the foundations of his system 
solid. Perhaps Hare's most honest position would be to say that he has 
set out the constraints imposed by one set of moral concepts and then 
to claim that by a moral intuition these moral concepts are preferable 
to other possible ones.
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Chapter IV Prescriptivity and Overridingness
The main conclusion to be drawn from the preceding chapters is that 
Hare's justification for his system is inadeuqate. In both chapters I 
have assumed that his account of the logical properties of the moral 
concepts and their implications is correct and have queried the sanction 
of those logical properties from two different standpoints. In Chapter II 
it was suggested that Hare gives no telling reason why a rational agent 
should use moral concepts at all; in Chapter III, I argued that even if 
someone does want to be moral, it is not obvious that he should be 
committed to using a moral concept like 'ought' which we happen to have 
in our language. But even if these objections are correct. Hare's project 
may not be irreparably damaged. He can claim that at the very least he 
has given an accurate account of the logical implications of the concepts 
we have, and that if we wish to carry on using them we should be aware 
of them, i.e. aware that rationality and the logical properties of the 
moral concepts constrain us to issuing utilitarian prescriptions.
We must now turn to examining whether this last claim can be vindicated.
In this chapter I want to examine Hare's claim that 'ought' is prescriptive. 
Hare defines prescriptivity on page 21 of MT:
"We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, 
some situation S, and some person P, if P were to assent (orally) 
to what we say and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting 
insincerely."
Prescriptivity is closely connected to, but should not be confused with, 
GVérridingness. Hare defines overridingness on p.56 of MT:
"To treat a principle as overriding is to let it always override other 
principles when they conflict with it and in the same way let it 
override other prescriptions, including non-universalisable ones."
Hare says that at the critical level moral principles are both prescriptive 
and overriding. Prescriptivity implies that if one holds that "In 
situation S, one ought to do X" then we must usually do X if one gets 
into situation S: it therefore might be thought that one must be treating
the principle as overriding. In other words, since prescriptivity entails 
action (under the right circumstances) it is easy to conclude that it 
entails overridingness, and that overridingness is a necessary condition 
of prescriptivity. However, although the definition on MT p.21 does not 
make this clear, elsewhere Hare says that the two requirements are 
distinct, since moral principles at the intuitive level must be 
prescriptive but need not be overriding. That this has to be the case 
is obvious, when we recall that moral principles can conflict with each 
other. Therefore it would be nonsense to say that they could both be
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overriding. Hare s position is that at the intuitive level some 'ought' 
judgments are overridable - but only by other moral 'ought' judgments.
So the statement I ought to keep this promise" is still prescriptive 
if on an occasion it is overridden by the principle "I ought to help a 
friend" : but not if it is overridden by the non-universalisable
prescription "Let me enjoy myself". Thus prescriptivity can be seen as 
saying that moral principles are overriding over non-moral principles.
At the critical level of moral thinking, where principles can be framed 
in such detail that they do not conflict, moral principles are held by 
Hare to be both prescriptive and overriding.
It seems to me that prescriptivity as Hare defines it is a pretty extreme 
requirement. Prescriptivity is plausible insofar as it asserts the 
connection between making a moral judgment and action. The opposing 
doctrine - descriptivism - states that the meaning of a moral judgment 
is fully exhausted by statements relating to what properties an action 
has; e.g. "X is right" means "X is approved of by most people" or 
"X produces most happiness". Hare's view is that moral words are partially 
descriptive but also have a prescriptive element - in fact their main 
purpose is to guide conduct. Some words are obviously purely descriptive 
e.g. "horse". To call something a horse is merely to say that it conforms 
to having certain properties; it is not in itself a way of commending it.
In contrast a prescriptive statement need not state a fact at all - e.g. 
the imperative "Do it!" Hare's suggestion is that moral statements have 
such an affinity with imperatives that they cannot be considered purely 
descriptive. Compare for instance "X is a black horse" and "X is the best 
horse". The former statement would only actually be a way of commending 
it (e.g. if you know that the hearer liked black horses): in itself the word 
"black" is purely descriptive. Conversely "best" is prescriptive in that 
to say that it is the best horse is not so much to say that it has certain 
properties (although it may well be doing this as well) as that it is the one 
that you would pick, given that you were going to pick a horse, ceteris
paribus. Hare would say that a moral "best" shared with this non-moral
"best" the property of being prescriptive.
Now it seems quite right to say that moral statements do in general aim 
to guide conduct and do in general commit the speaker to have some 
inclination to see that the prescribed state of affairs is brought about, 
given that he is in a position to do so.
But Hare goes much further than this: he is not merely saying that if we
say "You ought to do X" we have some motivation towards doing X; he is
going so far as to say that if we can do it, and no other moral judgments 
override it, we will do it. Two doctrines can be distinguished, which 
for obvious reasons I will label Ps and Pw.
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Ps: If an agent says he ought to do X, then given that he is in a position
to do so he must do it (or withdraw his 'ought' statement) unless he is 
also committed to another 'ought' statement which overrides it.
Pw: If an agent says he ought to do X, he must not treat the doing of X
with total indifference: he must in certain circumstances actually be
motivated towards doing X: though in certain circumstances he may let an
'ought' statement be overridden by a non-moral prescription.
Ps affirms that an agent will never let an 'ought' statement be overridden 
by a non-moral prescription whereas Pw allows for this possibility.
The trouble with Ps is that it denies the existence of a very well-known 
phenomenon, i.e. backsliding. Backsliding or moral weakness occurs 
precisely when an agent does X despite his believing that he ought not 
to do X, when he is not somehow forced into doing X. Common sense 
informs us that moral weakness is a feature of everyday life: certainly
most people would not claim that they did everything that they thought 
they ought to do. Before we go into the prescriptivist's possible 
explanation of backsliding we should perhaps look into the reason why 
Hare holds Ps and not merely Pw (according to Pw, of course, moral weakness 
can occur) . In order to do this we need to jump ahead of ourselves a 
little in our examination of the argument Hi - Hll. For the reason why 
Pw will not suffice for Hare is to be found in the transition from 
H9 - HlO. By means of steps H5 - H 9 Hare hopes to have established 
that at the end of critical thinking I must have a preference of the 
form "Let X be done" or "Let X not be done" corresponding to the preferences 
of all those people affected by the action X (including myself). But 
without Ps it would not be obvious what bearing this fact would have on 
what I say ought to be done. Why must I say that X ought to be done 
merely because I prefer on balance that it should be done? Ps provides 
the answer: I can say "X ought to be done" sincerely only if I am going
to actually do X in the circumstances, which for Hare means that I must 
prefer on balance that X be done. The argument works like this: H5 - H7 
ensure that the agent prefers on balance that the utilitarian action is 
done, and prescriptivity ensures that only that prescription which one 
prefers on balance be done can be made in an 'ought' statement. 
Prescriptivity rules out any non-utilitarian 'ought' statements, e.g. 
suppose that someone started off with the non-utilitarian prescription 
that he ought to exact revenge on an enemy. Steps H5 - H9 (if correct) 
would mean he would prefer that the utilitarian outcome would prevail 
(i.e. that revenge be not exacted); so prescriptivity would entail 
that he withdraw his original 'ought' statement. We can now see why 
Pw will not do for Hare; for if this were true the seeker of revenge 
could still hold his statement that he ought to exact revenge, since he
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could in some way still be instructed to do so. He does have a preference 
to exact revenge; but his overall preference is to refrain from doing so. 
Consequently Pw would not be sufficient for Hare's argument for 
utilitarianism to go through.
So Hare is committed to defending Ps , which means that he must somehow 
explain away backsliding. I will first consider three possible accounts 
of backsliding which would save Ps, and then give both empirical and 
theoretical reasons why I think these fail.
First we must consider the account of backsliding given by Hare in MT.
In MT III he suggests that cases of moral weakness can be compared with 
those of moral conflict. The latter phenomenon may at first sight appear 
to be an equally effective refutation of his theory. For since at the 
intuitive level moral principles conflict they cannot all be acted upon: 
so how can they be prescriptive? Hare's answer is that whilst they cannot 
all be overriding they can retain their prescriptivity. He says that 
"if applied they (the principles) would require a certain action, but 
we just do not apply them in a certain case". He then makes this relevant 
to moral weakness by suggesting that much the same happens here: we do
not apply a (still supposedly prescriptive) moral principle in favour 
of a non-moral prescription.
All of this is somewhat curious. What, if anything, does it mean to say 
that "we hold a principle, but do not apply it" (MT p.59). For it 
appeared to be Hare's previous view that to hold a principle one must, 
in the appropriate circumstances, apply it. The whole point of prescriptivity 
is that it rules out my saying that I ought to give away all my income 
to Oxfam if I have not the slightest intention of doing so. Yet on the 
revised account I could hold this principle but simply not apply it.
Perhaps what Hare is getting at is that to hold a moral principle one
need not act on it every time one has the opportunity : it might be that
one can sincerely say that one ought to do X in S if, say 80% of the
time in S we do X. This is perhaps a more realistic view of what actually
happens but it won't do for Hare, since in the first instance it
contradicts his definition of prescriptivity (if it is consistent with
Pw but not Ps) and secondly it won't plug the gap between H9 and HlO: /
on this view I would say "I ought to take revenge" yet in this situation
not act on it, saying it was one of the 20% of occasions when I do not
'apply' the principle.
It seems to me that this solution works for neither moral conflicts 
nor weakness and that whilst the first can be solved in a different way .
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the latter problem cannot. The problem with moral conflicts is caused 
solely by the principles' generality. For example, someone might hold 
both: (1) One ought not lie
(2) One ought not to hurt peoples' feelings.
One might easily find onself in a situation where one cannot avoid 
breaking one of these moral principles. This does of course imply that 
they cannot both be overriding. But if they are still to be Ps they must 
be overriding over non-moral princples. As I have argued. Hare's 
suggestion that one does not 'apply' one of them is unsatisfactory since
it allows in cases where the applied principle is not a moral one. But
all one has to do to preserve the prescriptivity of principles (1) and (2) 
is to suggest that they are subject to the tacit qualification: "provided 
that there is no feature of the situation which critical thinking informs 
me brings a competing and overriding moral principle into play". If this 
is done then clearly whichever is applied neither (1) nor (2) is breached.
However such a solution is not possible in the case of moral weakness.
For then the qualification would have to be something like "provided 
there is no feature of the situation which means it is greatly in my 
interests not to apply it"; which is plainly non-univeralisable. The 
fact of the matter is that cases of moral weakness are precisely those 
states where a non-universalisable prescription overrides a supposedly 
prescriptive universalisable one: here any solution must, for it to work
for Hare, deny that moral weakness proper ever occurs.
One such solution would be to claim that in all cases of supposed moral 
weakness the agent doesn't really accept the principle. No doubt there 
are caèes where this is a suitable characterisation of the situation: 
cases where we are using an inverted commas sense of 'ought' and 
really mean something like "it is generally held that one ought to 
keep promises" and not saying that it is a principle we ourselves hold. 
Again it could be that the agent is insincere - he is pretending to us 
that he holds a moral principle himself but knows he doesn't really-or 
perhaps is even deceiving himself - has even convinced himself he believes 
that he ought to do X, but somehow in reality he does not. All these 
are quite possible, but it seems rather unlikely that they can be made 
to cover every instance of moral weakness. A problem here is that 
whatever counterexample one brings forth, it is always open for the 
prescriptivist to counterclaim that for some reason this isn't a bona fide 
case of an agent fully believing that he ought to do X yet not doing it 
in a situation where he can. As has been allowed, this can be a legitimate 
ploy, but if carried to extremes it can make the prescriptivists's
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argument circular. No doubt to him it isn't a proper use of 'ought' 
since for it to be so an agent must actually do the action when he is 
able to. But this is the very assertion that is being tested, so it can 
hardly be assumed. Rather we must have an open mind about whether 
prescriptivism is true, and use our linguistic intuitions to see if 
ordinary language allows that this is a proper use of 'ought' (my 
argument of the previous chapter has not denied that linguistic 
intuitions cannot be used to see whether a word - as it is used - has 
certain properties: I suggested that we need further reasons as to
why we should use the word in this sense).
So any argument is bound to be inconclusive, since the prescriptivist's 
linguistic intuitions are bound to tell them that in all cases of moral 
weakness the agent doesn't fully believe he ought to do X (or else 
that there is some other reason why it is not moral weakness proper). 
However, I will pretend this problem doesn't exist and hope that the 
majority of people will agree with me that in the following example the 
agent does believe that he ought to do what he refrains from doing, 
and that this is in no way an improper or weak sense of 'ought'
The example I have in mind is as follows:
A bank clerk considers that it is wrong to steal money. He has never 
stolen any before and whenever he reads in the newspapers of burglaries 
he is filled with genuine moral disapprobation. Like most people, he 
believes that stealing is wrong, and proof of this is provided by both 
what he says and what he does. To make this last point more persuasive, 
letus suppose that for very many years he has known a foolproof way of 
stealing a large quantity of money from his bank without anyone ever 
knowing he v;as responsible. Let us assume that such is the ingenuity of 
this scheme that the probability of his being found out is negligible.
Yet he does not steal the money, not because it is against his interest 
to steal, but because he believes it would be wrong. We have here, I 
suggest, as bona fide a case as any of someone believing it is wrong to 
steal. Now supposing that through some unsuccessful business enterprise 
he loses his life savings and, filled with the prospect of having to 
sell his house and car> he decides to undertake his scheme which involves 
robbing the bank and doing what he thinks is wrong. We can even suppose 
that at the very moment he is undertaking the robbery eh is feeling 
considerable moral guilt, and afterwards, though he is never suspected, 
he regrets that he had to do the act (though would still do it again 
if the same situation arose). I submit that in these circumstances if 
freed from theoretical preconceptions most people would say that the 
man did what he thought he ought not to do. Of course the prescriptivist 
could try to maintain that this was not the case; he could say (not
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very plausibly) that the man had changed his moral principles. But to 
repeat, on Hare's own admission, one must take people's linguistic intuitions 
about how to use the word 'ought' as binding: so if my claim that most
people would think this was a valid use of 'ought' is correct then this 
defence of prescriptivism fails.
At no point does Hare himself place much emphasis on the above defence:
I mention it only because it rules quite a number of alleged cases of
moral weakness. Hare himself, in Freedom and Reason, argues that if the
agent accepts a moral principle but fails to act on it then it must be
the case that he was psychologically unable to follow it. The suggestion
is lent credence by analogy to cases of physical compulsion; i.e. we
would not say a man believed he ought to lie if he only did so when
someone was pointing a gun at his head. The prescriptivist is saying
that, if he could, the agent would adhere to his moral principles : but
psychological forces deprive him of his free will. Clearly there are
examples where this happens, e.g. kleptomania. But is it really plausible
to suggest that this happens in every case of moral weakness? Take our
bank clerk again. The prescriptivist could claim that he was forced
by his impending ruin to act as he did and that psychologically he
could not cope with the shame inherent in losing his possessions. The
trouble with this sort of suggestion is that in a sense it is empty,
since it is’ impossible to prove one way or the other. As Taylor argues
in his review of "Freedom and Reason", Hare needs to give a separate
account of "psychologically unable". It is no good at all simply to
assume that in cases where moral weakness occurs the agent was psychologically
unable to do otherwise; this would be circular and would make prescriptivism
true whatever the world was like. If Hare can tell us what it is for
someone to be psychologically unable then we can investigate as to
whether those prone to moral weakness actually are unable to do otherwise.
But in Freedom and Reason he provides no such account. Furthermore I
suspect that were he to do so this view would not only be falsifiable,
it would also be falsified. A reasonable first attempt at a definition
of "psychologically unable" might be that "the agent could not have
done otherwise, whatever he had decided". Of course in a sense we are '
always "overcome by desire" in that it is analytic that the strongest
desire wins out. But in the majority of cases this does not preclude
our making a rational and deliberate choice to do the immoral act. Not
all cases of moral weakness can be said to be cases where the agent
could not have done otherwise, whatever he had chosen.
As I have been at pains to stress, the above arguments must have an air 
of inconclusiveness about them.
34
Not only do they rest on hypothetical examples, which it could be claimed 
are suspect in that they are atypical, but also they rest on my linguistic 
intuitions which, again, are in no way authoritative. Moreover, there is 
always an alternative position for Hare. He could say that there are 
grey areas in our language and that 'ought' is used as I have suggested 
so that it allows moral weakness. But he could suggest that his theory 
is true of an ideal language, where 'ought' was used in the way he suggests.
No one could suggest that a language could not exist where 'ought' was 
Ps: I have only said that our 'ought' is not. Of course this revised
Harean position would entail some alterations in the argument': he could
no longer claim that he was merely analysing the concepts as he found 
them. But if the argument of the previous chapter was correct, the fact 
that we use 'ought' in a certain way gives it no sanction over us anyway.
So it would not weaken his position.
I now wish to present an argument that will both dispel any feelings 
of unease that I am relying too much on anecdotes and also show that 
appeal to an ideal language will not do. This argument owes much to 
Singer's "The Triviality of the debate over the 'is-ought' and the 
definition of 'moral" (APQ 1973). Prescriptivism appears meritorious 
in that it ties an agent's moral principles to his action. According to 
prescriptivism, if I think I ought to do X, I will do X if I can. But in 
reality different people are motivated by different sorts of things, and 
in consequence they treat different considerations as being overriding.
If we knew enough about someone we could make a list in order of priority 
of all the things he considered important. Now it seems a fairly indisputable 
fact that for some people moral concerns would be at the top of the 
list, for others selfish non-univeralisable ones would be and for yet 
others aesthetic considerations would be. It follows that in a given
situation some will do the right act, some the self-interested one, and
some that which is most aesthetically pleasing. I am not claiming that 
people can realistically be said to always do either the moral, self- 
centred or aesthetic act; rather that different people tend to give 
priority to each. The self-interested man may usually do the selfish 
act, but where the self-sacrifice is not very great he may do the moral /
act. Now so long as 'moral' is taken to mean "what would commonly be 
regarded as moral", this in itself does not provide a refutation of 
prescriptivism. For Hare can reply that whatever sort of concern each 
man treats as overriding - that, for him, is his moral principle. Hare 
himself admits that were a man to treat aesthetic concerns as overriding 
then they would thereby become a moral principle. So at the cost of
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baking no constraint on content, prescriptivism can be saved. But it will 
mean that there are some fairly odd 'moral' principles. For instance the 
self-interested man would say that it was quite all right for him to harm 
others so long as it did not adversely affect himself in the long run.
If it is accepted that some people do not consider their moral principles
as overriding then it follows that moral weakness occurs. But if we
re-define their moral principles as being their overriding principles, 
then moral weakness will not occur. But then we cannot make any other 
constraint on moral principles other than they be overriding - unless 
all principles that are treated as being overriding already share this 
property. For instance we cannot say that all moral principles must 
give weight to the interests of others - because some overriding principles 
do not. This holds whether it is the form or content of moral principles
we are putting a constraint upon. If Hare holds that moral principles
are always overriding (at the critical level) he cannot also maintain 
that they are always universalisable, because some overriding principles 
are not universalisable. Take our self-interested man who holds it is 
right to treat others badly. He does not hold this in the form "It is 
all right for everyone to treat everyone else badly". He thinks that it 
is all right for him to do so, but that everyone else should be moral in 
their dealings with him. His overriding prescription "Let me treat others 
badly, and them treat me well" is non-universalisable.
The problem for prescriptivism is that the world is not such that people 
always do acts which can, in any normal sense of the word, be described as 
being moral. Neither is this always through some failure in rationality 
on their part: it might be that in their list of values moral principles
do not come very high. Given this state of affairs, prescriptivism will 
be false if it insists that moral principles resemble what we now call 
moral principles, e.g. Hare's insistence that they are universalisable 
(which of course he needs for the argument Hi - Hll to go through).
The alternative, to place no constraints on their form or content but 
to say that moral principles are those that are treated by the agent as 
overriding, is not very palatable either because it then becomes an 
empty doctrine, true by definition and one which is misleading in that its 
moral principles may be what we would give very different names.
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Chapter V The Derivation of Utilitarianism
A central claim of "Moral Thinking" is that a rational agent will make 
moral judgments in line with utilitarianism. To the reader familiar with 
Hare's earlier works this might be a little surprising. In "Freedom and 
Reason" (FR) Hare gives a very similar account of the logical properties 
of the moral concepts - i.e. that they are universalisable and prescriptive - 
yet comes to a somewhat different conclusion concerning their impact on 
moral argument. It is worth quoting fairly fully what Hare had to say on 
this subject in FR p.97:
".........  it is of the utmost importance to stress that the fact that two
people express the same thing by 'ought' does not entail that they share
the same moral opinions. For the formal, logical properties of 'ought' ....
are only one of the four factors (logic, the facts, people's inclinations 
and their imagination) whose combination governs a man's opinion on a given 
matter. Thus, ethics, the study of the logical properties of the moral
words, remains morally neutral ___ its bearing upon moral questions lies
in this, that it makes logically impossible certain combinations of moral 
and other prescriptions. Two people who are using the word 'ought' in
the same way may yet disagree about what ought to be done in a certain
situation, either because they differ about the facts, or because one or 
other of them lacks imagination, or because their different inclinations 
make one reject some singular prescription which the other can accept."
The Hare of FR held that whilst the logic of the moral concepts entailed 
some constraints on what moral judgments an agent could make, there was 
still substantial scope for deciding upon one's own moral principles.
The fanatic might have been awkward for Hare in that it meant he had no 
conclusive arguments against say, a Nazi who was willing to say that Jews 
should be exterminated even if he himself was a Jew; but it did mean 
that his non-descriptivism remained intact. Although people without strong 
ideals who agreed on the facts and had similar capacity for imagination 
would tend to agree on what was right, these qualifications meant that 
one could not derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Two questions spring to 
mind: given that Hare's account of the logical properties is similar to 
that given in FR, how come he now thinks that utilitarianism is entailed 
when he didn't then and even if his new argument is correct, how can he 
claim that he is still a non-descriptivist?
It is not immediately obvious how prescriptivity (P) and universalisability 
(U) lead to even the constraints suggested in FR, i.e. that one had to 
consider the interests of those once affected, even if in the end one's 
ideals allow one to harm them. To see how this argument works it is hard 
to improve on Mackie's account of Hare's argument given in Chapter 4 of
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of his book "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong". Mackie suggests that
there are three stages of universalisation, each of which imposes further 
constraints on what the agent can prescribe. The first and weakest sense 
of universalisation rules out moral principles which mention names, times 
or places; i.e. one cannot say "I ought to be let off this crime".
Strictly speaking a moral principle is allowable if it contains non- 
universal terms as long as the agent is willing to translate it into 
sentences which contain only universal terms, i.e. the above sentence 
would be all right as long as the agent was willing to assent to the 
sentence "All those in a relevantly similar position should be let off 
this crime". Interpreted in this way universalisation rules out the more 
flagrant egoist principles such as "I ought to be let off this crime 
but others should be punished". As Mackie points out, though, as it stands 
it is a relatively weak constraint: egoism is not ruled out as long as one
can assent to the universal principle "Everyone should promote only their 
own happiness" and you can frame moral principles which are unfair in 
that they discriminate against people with different tastes, ideals, 
or in a different social position, e.g. if you are very wealthy you 
have no problem translating "Let me pay only 5% income tax" into 
"Let everyone only pay 5% income tax".
Hare's position in Freedom and Reason actually involves a stronger sense 
of universalisation than this (or more accurately it involves a combination 
of universalisation and prescriptivism). Not only has one got to exclude 
non-universal terms but also one has to put oneself in the place of those 
whom one might affect. Thus the wealthy man alluded to above may not be 
able sincerely to assent to the proposition "Let me receive the benefits 
consequent on everyone paying only 5% tax if I am poor and sick". There 
is a problem here though over the meaning of putting oneself in the other 
person's position. The idea is that the moral agent still has the freedom 
to choose what moral principles he likes, but he must be willing to have 
those principles carried out even if he was in the position of those whom 
they harmed. So the rich man has to suppose that he could be the poor man; 
in an example used by Hare the jazz fan has to imagine that he is in the 
position of someone who dislikes jazz music. It may be that a fanatical 
Nazi would assent to his being exterminated were it discovered that he 
was a Jew. But plainly even if one imagines one has the other person's 
social standing, and tastes, one would not fully be putting oneself in his 
position. In particular one won't be imagining oneself with his ideals. 
This then is the third stage of universalisation: to put oneself so
thoroughly in the shoes of the other person that one has his ideals, 
tastes and social circumstances. But now the enterprise becomes somewhat 
incoherent: one is supposed to be judging - from the point of view of
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one's own ideals - what one would say if one were in the position of 
someone else - with different ideals. I suggest that as it stands 
this test makes no sense.
As I have said, stage 2 universalisation matches Hare's position in 
Freedom and Reason. He argues (FR p.113) that stage 2 can in fact be 
derived from prescriptivity and stage 1 universalisation. Hare argues 
that "we would not be prepared to prescribe universally that people's 
likes and dislikes should be disregarded by other people, because this 
entails prescribing that other people should disregard our likes and 
dislikes". In other words we prefer the sort of world where others take 
note of differences in taste to one where people assume that everyone 
has the same likes as they. Even this is debatable in certain instances - 
e.g. a devotee of classical music may say that even were the jazz fan 
who detested classical music he would want classical music to be played.
But then the man's preference for classical music would have turned from 
being a mere liking into being an ideal.
Stage 2 universalisation (which I will henceforth refer to as U2) 
provides a powerful basis for moral argument. Of course it is subject 
to all the criticisms levelled in Chapters 1 - 3 of the present work, 
but if these are waived U2 would settle many moral disputes. In making 
a moral statement the agent would be asked to imagine himself in the 
position of those whom it harms, with their likes and dislikes, and to 
decide whether he still wants the action to be done. He will be able to 
decide only if his desire for the act to be done is greater than any aversion 
he has in another's positon. One can therefore begin to see that U2 has 
some affinities with a desire - or preference-based utilitarianism. But 
plainly it does not come close to being identical with utilitarianism. 
Consider a bilateral case - e.g. Hare's example of the man contemplating 
putting another in jail, for non-payment of a debt. U2 says I must put 
myself in his place - with my ideals - and still assent to "Let me be put 
in prison." I will be able to do this only if my ideal that justice 
be done is stronger than my preference not to be put in prison. But 
preference-utilitarianism would balance all the preferences involved.
In this case one can distinguish four preferences: my ideal (or moral '
preference) that justice be done; my non-moral preference that this 
man who has deceived me is harmed; his non-moral preference not to be 
put in prison and his moral preference (which could be anything).
U2 does not weigh these four preferences: when I put myself in my position
only my preferences are considered and when I put myself in his position 
only my moral and his non-moral preferences are taken into account. At 
no stage does U2 take his moral preference into account. Only in the 
special case where my overriding ideal was preference-utilitarianism
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would all the preferences be taken into account - even though U2 would 
not be equivalent to utilitarianism, since his non-moral preference would 
be double-counted. So even in the bilateral case U2 is not equivalent 
to utilitarianism - a fact which Hare acknowledges by admitting that U2 
cannot touch a fanatic who is prepared for even his interests to be 
harmed in order to allow his ideal to be fulfilled.
In multilateral cases there are additional reasons why U2 may conflict 
with utilitarianism. U2 only considers two preferences at any one time: 
my moral preference and someone else's non-moral preference. It is a 
good test in that it ensures that my moral preference is not cooked to 
favour my own non-moral preferences; but it cannot be claimed that it 
succeeds in taking into account everyone else's non-moral preferences.
To be more precise, U2 as it stands is far more restrictive on what counts 
as a moral principle than preference-utilitarianism is. In the latter 
case I can say that I ought to do X if, on balance, the total preference- 
satisfaction of all concerned is maximised by my doing X with U2, though,
I have to go round all the parties individually and in every case my 
moral preference to do X has to be greater than their aversion for X.
To make this clearer, consider the example mentioned in Fr of the judge 
and the prisoner. Utilitarianism obviously sanctions a judge to send a 
convicted criminal to prison (assuming there is overwhelming evidence 
for his guilt, etc.) Under U2, however, the situation is by no means so 
clear. If the judge whole-heartedly puts himself in the position of the 
prisoner it may well be that he cannot sincerely assent to "Let me be 
put into prison" if his desire for freedom is stronger than his desire for 
justice. In this case it would not be that U2 endorsed the prisoner's 
view that he ought not to be put in prison; for when the judge puts 
himself in his own shoes - or in those of all those members of society 
who feel threatened by the liberty of the criminal - he cannot prescribe 
this either. So in the multilateral cases U2 seems much too strong; 
there will be many situations where no moral principle will pass the test.
Hare admits this but suggests that in the multilateral cases the strict 
procedure of U2 should be amended. Rather than putting oneself in each 
of those affected's positions one only has to apply U2 to the balance 
of everyone's preferences. So the judge doesn't have to prefer that 
were he the criminal he should be sentenced: rather he has to prefer
on balance, taking everyone's preferences into account equally, that the 
criminal be jailed. One way of doing this would be to imagine that one 
had an equal chance of being any of those affected; e.g. suppose there 
are a million people in the country, including the criminal: the criminal
prefers to be freed one hundred times as much as each of the others 
prefer that he be jailed. The judge will balance out the hundred "votes"
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against jail with the 999,999 votes for; so he will be able to prescribe 
universally that he be sent to jail. Whilst this method clearly allows 
moral judgments to be made in a way in which U2 did not, it is by no means 
obvious how this move can be justified. In FR Hare sees it justified by 
the impartiality required by universalisability: one must treat everyone 
equally unless there is some relevant difference. From this it could be 
argued that everyone's preferences must be considered equally. But 
universalisation has nothing to do with preferences (it is prescriptivity 
that makes these relevant): it only says we should, in a certain sense, 
be impartial. To say it means we must be impartial amongst preferences 
is to assume that preferences are the only relevant moral factor. The 
position is as follows: In the case of U2 preferences are relevant
because universalisability and prescriptivity entail that for me to 
say "I ought to do X" I must be prepared to have it done (i.e. prefer it) 
even when X harms myself. In multilateral eases U2 is too strong as it 
rules out even cases where just one party is seriously harmed: on the
other hand, I do not see any justification for Hare's assumption that 
we must be prepared to prescribe according to the balance of preferences.
Another difficulty with Hare's account of multilateral cases in FR is 
that there is an indeterminacy concerning which preferences should be 
counted. Recall that the agent must act on the balance of preferences.
But this could lead to any of three possibilities :
(1) The agent balances his moral preferences with the balance of 
everyone's non-moral preferences.
(2) The agent simply balances everyone's non-moral preferences.
(3) The agent balances out everyone's preferences, including their ideals
Possibility (1) is most akin to U2 whilst (2) and (3) are obviously versions 
of utilitarianism. Version (1) still allows for the existence of the 
fanatic. All three possibilities would require a more satisfactory 
justification than is given in FR.
We can now see that FR left Hare's theory in a rather unsatisfactory 
state. U2 certainly follows from universalisability and prescriptivity 
but does not seem to work in multilateral cases. The account given of 
multilateral cases approximates to utilitarianism (though is not 
identical in that Hare allows for the existence of the non-utilitarian 
fanatic) but is hardly justified properly in terms of universalisability 
and prescriptivity. In MT Hare attempts to remedy this situation by, in 
effect, abandoning U2 for a utilitarian position (equivalent to version (3) 
above). To arrive at utilitarianism Hare adds arguments H5 - HlO, which 
for the sake of convenience I reproduce below:
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H5: Rationality requires of us that we know all the facts relating to
the situation. These include facts about other people's preferences 
(in reality we will not be able to know all the facts, but we must
attempt to discover all those which are relevant - i.e. affect the
outcome of critical thinking).
H6: If I know that a person whom I may affect prefers with intensity L
that action A be done (or not be done) then I must know that were I, 
hypothetically, to be put in his exact position (including having his 
preferences) I too would prefer that X be done with intensity L.
H7: I cannot know that if I were in that position I would prefer that
X be done with intensity L (H6) unless I now prefer with intensity L 
that if, hypothetically, I were in his position, X should be done, 
i.e. H5 and H6 mean that I must now have a preference relating to what 
would happen to me were, hypothetically, I to be put in the other person's 
shoes.
H8: By universalisation I must make my hypothetical concern for other
people actual, i.e. I must convert my hypothetical preference that, were 
I in his shoes, x should be done, into an actual preference that X be 
done (even though as a matter of fact I am not in his position).
H9: From H7 to H8 it follows that I now have a preference that X be
done/not done, corresponding to the preferences of all those affected 
by X (including myself).
HlO: By prescriptivity and overridingness (H4) I can say "X ought to be done" 
sincerely only if I prefer on balance that it be done. From H9 it is 
clear that the only action which I prefer to be done on balance will be 
that generated by preference utilitarianism.
Therefore what ought to be done is answered by appeal to preference 
utilitarianism.
In the rest of this chapter I wish to examine this argument in detail.
H5 is important in that Hare needs to say that we must know what other 
peoples' preferences are: for according to H7, this means that I must
actually have a corresponding hypothetical preference. At face value 
H5 seems unobjectionable; few would deny that we need to know all the ,
relevant facts. What could be doubted is whether facts relating to 
preferences are the only relevant. Hare is not guilty of pre-supposing 
that they are relevant: rather he is saying "Imagine that they might be,
see if- given the logical properties of the moral words, this knowledge 
makes any difference, and if it does then it is relevant". Thus he could 
(to take a frivolous case) have said "Let's take as a candidate knowledge 
of peoples' names". He would then have found that this knowledge had
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no bearing whatsoever on what we can prescribe universally; so 
it could be rejected as being relevant. Where Hare can perhaps be 
criticised is that, having discovered that knowledge about preferences 
is relevant, he does not then go on to question whether or not other 
facts are relevant, e.g. factscbout the existence of God, or facts about 
what is objectively right.
H6, if it is true at all, is a tautology. The common sense response might 
be to suggest that just because Jones has, say a preference for junk 
food over homemade food doesn't mean that I would have if I were in his 
position. But of course if it is stipulated that I am in exactly his 
position then it follows that I must have his preferences. What can be 
doubted is whether the imagined person would really be me. If I am in 
exactly Jones's position then I must have exactly his (or her) likes 
and dislikes, ideals, sex, personality, social standing; in other words 
I am stripped of everything that makes me what I am. Hare's reply is 
that whilst this is true, the word "I" is not just a descriptive word, 
i.e. it doesn't just refer to the bundle of properties I happen to have, 
but also refers to me the prescriber, over and above the properties.
In making this claim Hare may have common opinion on his side. We do tend 
to think that there is some essential "I" which exists independently of 
whatever embodiment we have, and that this "I" could exist even if any 
characteristics were different (it would still somehow be me having 
the experiences). Thus we accept that in Kafka's Metamorphosis the 
subject of the story could turn into an insect yet still be him;
.equally many people think they could exist in an afterlife (presumably 
in a very different form). However, this view has been challenged by 
Parfit (Philosophical Review 1971), who argues that instead of identity 
we should talk in terms of survival. Survival is a matter of degree 
and the extent to which we survive, according to Parfit, depends on the 
degree of psychological and physical continuity and similarity. If 
Parfit's view is correct, then it is not clear how someone with whom I 
have nothing in common can be me. However, as the questions of personal 
identity are notoriously difficult this can hardly be taken as anything 
approaching a refutation of Hare.
More serious criticism can be levelled against H7. By H5 and H6 Hare 
establishes that I must know that were I in Jones's shoes I would prefer 
X with strength L. But H7 goes further in claiming that this entails 
that I must now prefer with strength L that X should happen, were I in 
Jones's position. It is claimed that knowledge about preferences must 
affect my set of preferences. The first difficulty arises concerning 
whether or not my preference with strength L that X should happen is 
properly termed a preference. At best it can be called a hypothetical
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preference in that - unlike most preferences - it does not relate to 
my actual circumstances, but only to hypothetical ones, i.e. normal 
preferences influence my action whereas hypothetical ones only do so if 
my circumstances change. My preference that were I Jones X should happen 
is on a par with my preference that were I say, a Russian, the Americans 
should suffer setbacks in their foreign policy. In both the latter cases 
the preference need have no influence whatsoever on what I do: my
objection is that Hare may be misleading in saying that it is now amongst 
my set of preferences.
Leaving this difficulty to one side, it is dubious whether the move made 
in H7 is valid anyway. It is correct only if there is a necessity for me 
to identify with this hypothetical future self. But if one thinks of 
cases, where my hypothetical preferences are radically opposed to my 
present ones, this loses some of its plausibility. For example, suppose 
a liberal is told that he is going to be brainwashed into holding extreme 
right-wing views - so that his future me will prefer that racist policies 
are affected. In this case there seems no contradiction in saying that 
I should not, now, prefer that the preferences of the future me are satisfied. 
Hare considers this objection (MT p.96) and counters it by suggesting that 
"I" is partially prescriptive. By this he means that by identifying 
myself with some person hypothetically I automatically identify with 
his preferences. Phillips Griffiths (Philosophy 1983) argues against 
this that there is no necessity in "I" being prescriptive. At most all 
that is true is that normally we do tend to express considerably greater 
concern for ourselves (including our future selves) than for others.
But this need not preclude a special sense of "I", which does not share 
this feature. In the case of the brainwashed liberal it would make 
perfect sense to say that that person was still him in that there was 
physical continuity, but still not identity with his preferences. It is 
arguable that the fact that we generally do want out own future preferences 
to be satisfied owes something to the arbitrariness of some preferences.
By this I mean that with very many preferences (e.g. a preference for 
tea over coffee) we don't very much mind which way it goes, but once 
we have it we want it to be satisfied. That is, with some preferences we 
are not much concerned with what they are for; possibly this is because /
they don't figure prominently in our conception of a good life. We 
dont't very much mind whether we are the sort of person who likes tea 
or one who likes coffee. With these preferences it is obvious why we are 
ready to prescribe that they are satisfied in the future: since their
object is irrelevant it doesn't matter if it changes. With other 
preferences though - political, moral and aesthetic ones - we are as 
much concerned with the object of the desire as with the fact that it is
us desiring them. The difference is that if I were told that in ten years
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time I would change my preference from tea to coffee, I would have no 
reason not to identify with this preference, whereas with preferences 
for things I think are intrinsically good this need not be the case. In 
fact I might wish that my preferences are satisfied whatever they are - 
if I think my views will be more mature and that they are developed 
autonomously. But as the brainwashing case shows we should have the 
right to withdraw our concern that our future preferences are satisfied 
in exceptional cases. So in the case where it is some other person we 
are meant to be identifying with, where the preferences are moral, or 
maybe they are irrational, it is doubtful whether I have to admit that 
I now have the preference that, were I in his situation, that preference 
should be satisfied.
So it is by no means certain that the argument of MT V works in 
establishing its intended conclusion, i.e. that if I have full knowledge 
of another person's preferences I shall myself have acquired preferences 
equal to his regarding what should be done to me were I in his situation. 
But even if this is granted, why does this, together with prescriptivity 
and universalisability, entail utilitarianism? The situation becomes 
clearer if it is compared with that in FR. As we saw U2 was too strong 
in multilateral cases, so Hare wanted to say that one had to balance 
out everyone's preferences. As I say, this is what he wanted, but it was
by no means clear how he could justify such a step. The preceding argument
appears to do just that. H5 - h 7 ensures that I have a hypothetical 
concern for each person I affect. H8 claims that universalisability 
means that I must make this hypothetical concern actual: since I must
balance out all the preferences of those whom I affect. According to 
Hare, the situation is akin to when our own preferences conflict and 
prudence requires that we act on the stronger preference. In his own 
words (MT p.llO):-
"I See no reason for not adopting the same solution here as we
do in cases where our own preferences conflict with one another
....... Suppose that it is my own bicycle and that it is
moderately inconvenient not to be able to park my car. I shall 
then naturally move the bicycle, thinking that that is what, 
prudentially speaking, I ought to do."
He continues by saying that in the bilateral cases if I have full 
information I will have acquired preferences equal to the other person's 
which are now conflicting with my original preferences. Since both the 
conflicting preferences are mine, I can deaf with it precisely as I deal 
with cases where the preferences are mine actually: I prescribe what,
on balance, I prefer.
However, McDermot (PQ 1983) has a persuasive argument suggesting that
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the cases are not parallel. Consider the case where both the bicycle 
and the car are mine. I have a preference that the bicycle 
should stay where it is and a stronger preference that it should be 
moved to enable me to park my car. Note that these preferences both 
relate to the same case; I am in the same position (i.e. a person who 
owns both a bike and a car) with respect to both preferences. Consequently 
the rational procedure is to balance them out and act on the stronger 
preference. But now compare this with the situation when someone else is 
the bike owner. Hare says, quite correctly (from H5 - H7) that I must 
have the preference that, were I the bike owner, the vike should stay 
where it is. According to the U2-type argument this would mean that I 
would have to withdraw my statement that the bike ought to be moved, since 
I cannot prescribe this action for the hypothetical situation when I 
occupy the other person's shoes. But Hare suggests that I have to balance 
this preference with my original preference that the bike be moved. It is 
correct to say that I will have the following preferences:
(1) I prefer that the bike should be moved;
(2) I prefer that, were I in the other person's position, the bike 
should not be moved.
Hare's position is that since (1) and (2) are both my preferences they 
can be balanced against one another. But McDermot points out that (1) 
and (2) are not conflicting in that they are not preferences about the 
same case. For in (1) I am in my own shoes, whereas in (2) I am in the 
other person's. Thus when considering my own predicament (2) would not 
be taken into account at all, since it is only a hypothetical preference. 
Equally when considering it from his viewpoint (1) will not be included 
in the calculation either.
McDermot's objection in effect echoes the earlier objection made about 
the multilateral version of universalisation given in FR. However, to be 
fair to Hare, it should be pointed out that McDermot may have missed 
something in Hare's argument. For as he states, universalisation has 
not entered into the argument at all. It is universalisation that means 
I must make my hypothetical concern actual. Hare says (MT p.223)
"Morality requires us to argue; since, if I were going forthwith 
to have the preferences which he actual has, I must now prescribe 
that they be satisfied, and since morality admits no relevant 
difference between "I" and "he" I am bound, unless I become an 
amoralist to prescribe that they be satisfied. This prescription 
will have to compete with others, but it is enough to have secured 
it a place in the competition."
This is suggestive of the following move. Preference (2) "I now prefer 
that if I were the bike owner it would not be moved" is converted into 
(2a) "I now prefer that, even though I am not the bike owner, it should
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not be moved". If (2a) were a necessary result of critical thinking 
then McDermot's objection would fail. Hare seems to think that it does 
follow; the question is, does universalisability entail this, i.e. that 
I prefer what I would prefer if I did not know what role I played in the 
situation. As I said earlier, it isn't obvious that it does. Hare says 
(MT p.108) that universalisability means we must make identical judgments 
about all cases identical in their universal properties.
Perhaps Hare has something like the following in mind. A moral judgment, 
being a universal prescription, must fulfill at least two criteria. We 
must be prepared to act upon it (from prescriptivity) and we must be 
prepared to do so whatever role we are in (by universalisability). In 
complex situations no principle is likely to pass such a stringent test. 
Since most courses of action are against someone's interests, a strict 
application of U2 would lead to no moral principles passing the test, 
i.e. to amoralism. Consequently somehow a compromise must be reached.
We must issue a prescription which, even if we wouldn't be prepared to 
issue it from all viewpoints, does at least take all of these viewpoints 
into equal account. Since we know what we would want done were we in 
other peoples' positions, we must balance out these preferences and act 
upon the conclusion.
So runs what I take to be a possible interpretation of Hare's position 
in MT. But whilst it is certainly a valid way for an individual to go 
about moral decision making, it is hard to see how it can be claimed that 
it is the only valid method. I do not see how it is required by 
universalisability as Hare defines it. Morality may require impartiality, 
but it is a value judgment in itself to say it requires impartiality of 
interests or preference satisfaction. This is the step that I think Hare 
misses in MT. As was argued earlier, it is quite a viable position to 
argue that it isn't just preference-satisfaction that matters; for some 
preferences at least what is the object of the preference matters too.
Only if the agent thinks that the object of the preference does not 
matter (or thinks that everyone's choice as to what matters should be 
respectived equally) does the above compromise work. In effect this is 
the problem of the fanatic - or as he is better called, idealist - 
returning again. The idealist will not accept that only preference- 
satisf action matters. For instance the man who believes in the sanctity 
of life - and believes that this view is objectively right - will not 
accept the above compromise. Suppose he is a doctor, deciding whether to 
allow a mongoloid baby to die. Hare cannot use the U2 type argument on 
him. "Would you accept this if you were the baby?" Since U2 can rule 
out even utilitarian prescriptions. All Hare can do is to tell him that 
he must be impartial, i.e. it must not be his own interests which influence
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his decision. But it isn't his interests but his ideals which determine 
the doctor's moral decision. He knows that were he the baby he would 
want to die. He might even admit that the baby's preference to die is 
stronger than his own preference for it to go on living. But if he 
thinks that the object of the preference matters as well as its strength 
Hare cannot say that he is making a selfish or non-moral decision. With 
his present beliefs - including the one that life shall be prolonged 
where possible - the doctor can quite sincerely prescribe that, whatever 
role he finds himself in, the life should be saved.
It follows that I do not regard the argument of MT as an improvement on 
FR. If anything, the argument in FR was better, since it recognised the 
last-mentioned problem. Both the arguments in MT and FR are susceptible 
to the criticisms made in Chapters 2 - 6 .  Prudence does not require us 
being moral, the reliance on linguistic intuitions is dubious and the claim 
that 'ought' is prescriptive in the strong sense required by Hare is 
false. In this chapter I have argued that the argument of MT V and VII 
does not show that the critical thinker will be utilitarian, even 
granting the rest of the argument. In the next two sections we shall 
investigate to what extent this wrecks Hare's purpose.
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Section II
Chapter VI Preference-utilitarianism, "irrational preferences
and happiness
Hare's official position in MT is that he does not need to justify his 
claim that preferences are morally relevant other than by showing that 
critical thinking (by arguments Hi-Hll) requires this. But if my 
arguments in Section I are correct, then this view requires amendment.
It might well be questioned whether Hare or anyone else would want to 
defend preference-utilitarianism (PU).if the argument Hi-Hll fails.
It is undoubtedly the case that the failure of Hi - Hll would force 
Hare to modify his claim that PU was sanctioned by our use of language.
But, as we shall see in Section III, Hare's distinction between the two 
levels of moral thinking makes PU a much more defensible doctrine than 
would otherwise be the case. Moreover PU could be justified in a way which 
might not be so very alien to Hare's way of thinking. It could be claimed 
that it was prudent - and consequently rational - to maximise one's one 
preference-satisfaction and that morality requires the treatment of others 
as we would like to be treated; hence we must maximise preference- 
satisfaction for everybody. This last conclusion could be reached either 
by appeal to universalisability or else by some impartial ideal observer 
theory. On this revised view Hare would no longer rely in any way on 
prescriptivity, nor on the dubious argument of MTv and VI, nor indeed on a 
claim about the sanction of linguistic intuitions. He would, however, have 
to give a strong argument showing that preference satisfaction was 
intrinsically desirable. Even if Hare were to try to defend this position 
in MT he would have to give a much fuller account of what a preference is 
in order for critical thinking to be workable. In this section my minimum 
objective is to consider some of the ambiguities relating to PU; at most 
I hope to show its links with happiness-based theories and reasons for 
thinking preference.-satisfaction is morally relevant.
Before entering into a discussion of PU, it may be in order to say a 
few words about happiness-utilitarianism (HU) and why PU has been more 
popular of late. HU, as advanced by Mill so that it does not relate 
exclusively to physical sensations of pleasure, has a great initial 
attraction. Conceptually there is a difficulty in saying one does not 
want happiness: it is arguable that happiness is something that a rational
agent must want. But of late HU has fallen out of favour for two very 
good reasons. One is the difficulty of measuring happiness. HU requires 
that we add up the total amount of happiness created by an action, yet 
any value given to happiness necessary for interpersonal comparisons 
appears arbitrary. More serious still, it is by no means clear what we 
are supposed to be measuring. No utilitarian has been able to give a
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clear account of happiness. Lloyd Thomas (Philosophical Quarterly 1968) 
argues that HU has seemed plausible only because utilitarians have traded 
on an ambiguity between two different meanings of happiness. In fact 
Lloyd Thomas distinguishes four uses of "happy" but only two of these 
are said to be very significant. The first is roughly equivalent to 
feeling happy at specific moments and the other involves an appraisal 
of one's life over a relatively long period. It is this last use which 
has by far the greatest appeal as a criterion to evaluate consequences by: 
it is far more plausible to suggest that we should make people have 
happy lives than to say we should give them feelings of happiness (which 
seem to be morally trivial). Lloyd-Thomas suggests that a person is 
happy in the second (ethically relevant) sense if the circumstances of 
life in which he is actually placed live up to his standards for a good 
life. Lloyd-Thomas argues that this sense of happiness gives HU its 
plausibility, but it is happiness in the first sense which makes the 
diction "pursue happiness" more than empty advice. One is told to live 
up to one's standards for the good life, but one is not told what standard 
to set. So HU falls between two stools: either it tells us to maximise 
feelings of happiness - which is implausible - or else it tells to try 
to live up to whatever standard we set outselves, which is hardly very 
useful advice.
Preference utilitarianism (PU) seems attractive because it avoids some 
of the defects of HU. In particular whereas happiness is a somewhat 
vague and ghostly concept a preference is directly cashable in action - 
as Hare says (MT p.104). "We shall in any case do what the balance of 
our present preferences requires", thereby implying that preferences are 
a behavioural concept. Whereas it is perhaps an impossible task to be 
certain which option would make someone most happy in a given situation 
it is, so the argument goes, much simpler to discover what he prefers 
most - it is simply what he does. Unfortunately if "preference" is a 
purely behavioural concept PU lacks some of the attraction HU has.
As has been said, happiness seems self-evidently morally relevant; 
whereas PU somehow lacks this quality. After all, PU amounts to letting 
people do whatever they want to do, not what is in their interests. It 
is a commonplace for people to do things against their interests, either 
through some failing in perception or reason. If a preference is by 
definition something which disposes someone to act in a certain way then 
there seems no room for the preference-utilitarian to act in people (s 
interests where this conflicts with what they happen to want. But the 
behaviouristic definition is not the only possible one. We could equally 
say that someone only has a preference to do X (or a preference adjusted 
for failures in logic and knowledge) if X is what he would consider to be
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best if he was reasoning properly and was in full command of the facts.
We have therefore distinguished two senses of preference:
(1) PB, one has a preference to do X if one is disposed to X: if one
does X then one has an overriding preference to do X.
(2) PI, one has a preference to do X if X is what one would PB if one
were in full possession of the facts and reasoning properly.
PI still says that only preference satisfaction matters. Moreover it 
still says that only the agent's own feelings count: we cannot say that
X is in his interests unless he himself would say this, were he in a 
better position to judge. PI has the substantial advantage over PB in 
that there is a much stronger argument for it being rational to maximise 
Pl-satisfaction than it is PB-satisfaction. Moreover maximising PI- 
satisfaction has close affinities with making someone happy - if Lloyd- 
Thomas 's second, ethically significant sense is being used. These 
advantages are gained at the price of a preference no longer being at 
all easy to discover. I propose to start off with Hare's apparent position 
that we should maximise PB-satisfaction, and see what amendments to this
the rational agent would make (either in the sense of a rational, self-
interested or moral agent).
The most obvious flaw with PB's is that on occasions they reflect 
incomplete or even mistaken information. At this point, it is helpful 
to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental preferences. An intrinsic 
preference is for something regarded by the agent as an end in itself, 
whereas a preference is instrumental if it is held only because it leads 
to something else which one wants. Historically many utilitarians have 
been reductionists in that they have wanted to say that all preferences 
are intrinsic preferences - for pleasure, or happiness, or enjoyment.
But this view is not very plausible, unless one makes these terms so 
vague and all-embracing that the claim that all preferences are for 
them is virtually empty. Preference utilitarians are by no means 
compelled to take this reductionist view though.
This need not mean that preferences are above criticism. If I understand 
him correctly. Hare held the fully consistent position that intrinsic 
preferences can be for whatever the agent chooses them to be, yet all 
preferences should be amended to withstand exposure to logic and the 
facts. In the case of instrumental preferences it is easy to see how 
they can be mistaken. For example, suppose I wish to go from London to 
Oxford and wish to get on a train purely because of this wish (i.e. my 
only reason for wanting to go on the train is that I wish to go to Oxford). 
Suppose, however, that unknown to me this train is the express non-stop 
to Swansea. Should my preference be counted in a utilitarian calculation? 
For instance, supposing a friend is standing by the platform, fully aware
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of my situation. If he were a PB-utilitarian then he would not try to 
stop me getting on the train : as revealed by my behaviour, I have an
overriding preference to get on this train. Yet if I were fully possessed 
of the facts I would no longer have this preference: indeed I would have
a strong preference not to get on this train. Thus my friend, if he is a 
Pl-utilitarian, will take measures to prevent me boarding the train and 
this, I take it, would be in line with most people's intuitions regarding 
the case. Most people would think it was a bad moral theory which said 
I should stay on the wrong train.
With instrumental preferences criticm is possible because the act might 
not lead to what we think it will. By definition, though, intrinsic 
preferences cannot fail such criticism, since we do not value them for 
anything they produce (if we did they would become instrumental). One 
position would be to say that instrumental preferences can be criticised 
but intrinsic ones cannot. But this would lead to rather implausible 
prescriptions in some cases. For instance, suppose I have an intrinsic 
preference for all Rembrandt paintings. The preference is intrinsic 
because I don't want the paintings for their value, or as a status symbol: 
I just like and admire them. Now suppose I see that a Rembrandt is coming 
up for auction next week, and I form an intrinsic preference to have this. 
But let us imagine that this painting is in fact a fake: should my
preference now be discounted? (assuming I would not want the painting 
if I knew it was a fake). There seems no more reason for saying that it 
should count than in the case of instrumental preferences. The reason 
why preferences of both types can be criticised is that even intrinsic 
preferences may be desired for a reason, even if they are not desired 
because they lead to anything. Thus my preference for the painting is 
contingent upon its falling under a certain description (i.e. being 
painted by Rembrandt) though it would be tortuous to suggest that my 
preference for the painting was in fact an instrumental preference for 
a Rembrandt. It is accepted that intrinsic preferences can depend on 
reasons yet still be intrinsic, then clearly they are as much open to 
criticism as the reason is. To make the types of criticism misinformation 
can lead to clear, consider the following example :
Suppose someone prefers an Agatha Christie play to Shakespeare. Now a 
non-utilitarian may hold that on aesthetic grounds this preference 
should be discounted. A preference-utilitarian cannot discount it and 
still be regarded as a preference-utilitarian, unless he says that the 
preference is not what the agent would have if he were fully exposed to 
logic and the facts. If the preference is instrumental, e.g. the man 
wants to see that play which will gain him greater regard from other
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people, then it can perhaps be shown that the preference is mistaken.
But even if it is intrinsic the preference is not beyond criticism.
This could be the case, not only if this play were not in fact written 
by Agatha Christie (which parallels the Rembrandt case). It could also 
be that the theatre-goer believes that this play has been performed on 
more occasions than the Shakespeare, and that this is a deciding factor 
for him preferring it. Were this claim false, then it appears that the 
reason for holding the intrinsic preference would be false, and hence 
the preference could be criticised.
Preferences can also be regarded as being open to amendment if they do 
not take future preferences into full consideration. One of the most 
common forms of irrational behaviour is to prefer the near to the distant 
simply because of its proximity in time. It is plausible to suggest 
that a prudent man will maximise his total preference-satisfaction and 
will not fall victim to favouring present over future preferences. If 
this claim is accepted then the man whose present preferences do not 
adequately reflect future preferences should have his preferences amended. 
Otherwise the results will be strongly counterintuitive. For example 
consider the man considering having another drink despite his knowing 
that it will lead to him having a dreadful hangover in the morning.
Assume further that, if he were asked which was better - avoiding the 
hangover or having this drink - he would reply that the former was 
preferable. Yet irrationality may lead to him nevertheless having the 
drink. Let us once more imagine ourselves as an ideal observer. Do we 
prescribe that the man has another drink? Clearly we would not - yet 
the PB-utilitarian would have no option but to do so, since the man ' s 
behaviour would indicate that this is what he wants. A Pl-utilitarian 
will therefore take into account, not an agent's current set of preferences, 
but both his now-lbirnow and now-for-then preferences, with the latter 
fully representing his later now-for-now preferences.
The first and second phenomena - i.e. misinformation and inadequate 
planning - often combine. Very frequently we will be uncertain or 
mistaken about what our future preferences will be. This is an inescapable 
fact of human existence, and in practice much misery is caused by it.
The preference-uti litarian cannot help the situation, in that he is as 
prone to this uncertainty as much as anyone else (though he can at least 
point it out and consequently warn against arrangements which rely on 
preferences being stable e.g. arguably, marriage). But there will be 
situations where the moral thinker is in a position to know someone's future 
preferences better than the agent himself. The classic example of this is 
with children. PB-U would be disastrous with children - partially because
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they are guilty of preferring the present, but mainly because they are 
unaware of what they will want in the future. A PB-utilitarian would 
have to give the child's preference not to go to school due consideration; 
it may well be that he would prescribe that they should not go. Yet the 
Pl-utilitarian has no difficulty with this case; the children themselves 
would (in most cases) prescribe that they go to school were they aware 
of their future preferences.
There is a third way in which preferences could be amended. It is 
plausible to suggest that what we ought to aim for, as preference- 
utilitarians, is to get as many people as possible close to those 
circumstances they would consider best were they fully informed and 
planned correctly to take future preferences into account. But even if 
the two amendments suggested are made there would still be a difference 
between a person's preference and what they could consider is best.
What people do is determined by their desires (in a sense of desire 
this is analytic). But we have attitudes to our desires, and we do not 
always regard those desires which are strongest (i.e. those that win out) 
as those which are most important, in the sense that they are what 
should determine our behaviour. In fact we can positively disapprove of 
certain of our desires. A dramatic example of this is kleptomania.
The kleptomaniac does steal - hence he must have a preference to steal - 
yet he would not say that this is what he thought he (prudentially) 
should be doing; it is not what he desires to desire. This sort of 
thing does not only happen with abnormal people though. Suppose I am 
working late at night and am considering whether or not to read another 
chapter. I might decide that this is what I should do, that this is the 
rational course of action. Yet my weariness might lead me to say to 
myself "Never mind the consequences, I am going to sleep". This example 
shows that this phenomenon tends to merge with the second type, i.e. 
improper weighting of preferences. Nevertheless the two are distinct. 
Improper balancing is just one source of irrational behaviour. It may
be that there are no future considerations involved.
For instance someone could find themselves doing things which would 
indicate that they valued money highly (they work long hours and are 
careful with their money) yet could honestly say that they did not 
really think money very important. Our attitudes to desires we find 
ourselves with may in some cases lead to those desires changing, but 
this need not happen.
People will do what they consider to be best only to the extent that 
their occurrent desires are in tune with these rational evaluations of 
value. It could be argued that we should take into account what people 
really think is best rather than what, through a failure of reason to
overcome some drive, they end up in doing. This is less clear cut than
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in the previous two criticisms, since it is also arguable that the best 
way of discovering what people value is to look at their behaviour. In 
any case there are real problems in determining what someone's evaluation 
of worth is. Apart from the practical difficulties, there may be no 
determinate answer to the question, since evaluations vary with moods. 
Obviously when someone is angry, or tired, or hungry, or irritated, 
his evaluation may not be very reliable. So it might be thought that we 
take his rational evaluation to be that when he is in a normal frame of 
mind. The problem though is that for many people there is no "normal" 
frame of mine; we can imagine them as typically being in one of several 
moods and their rational evaluation may vary with the mood. For instance 
when they are in an artistic frame of mind they might think that 
appreciating fine paintings is the most worth while pursuit ; when hungry 
they might sincerely think that there is no greater delight than eating 
good food, when contemplative they might believe that the quest for 
knowledge is the most important thing for man. Many desires - those for 
food, sleep, sex - are cyclical. It seems arbitrary to say that one 
part of the cycle leads to a more normal frame of mind than any other.
These difficulties with the concept of something being considered to 
be of worth by the agent make a form of PU which insisted that this is 
what we need to discover problematic.
Yet it is equally unpalatable to take the alternative position, which 
involves counting the kleptomaniac's preference to steal. Perhaps some 
compromise can be found whereby we rule out•abnormal desires which are 
out of tune with the normal character of the man. Undoubtedly this too 
would entail embracing difficulties; it is best left open whether or not 
this type of irrational preference is amended.
Our revised preference-utilitarianism (PU2) would perhaps be better 
labelled interest-utilitarianism. Nevertheless it retains the link with 
PU in that it relates to what people would prefer after exposure to logic 
and the facts. Moreover it copes with many of the difficulties of PUB. 
Brandt (A Theory of the Good and the Right, pp.2 and 8) suggests that 
happiness is a better guide to welfare than preference-satisfaction 
because we care about securing other people's happiness rather than 
getting what they want. Indeed it might be suggested that parents, who 
want to ensure the well-being of their children, see their prime task 
to be stopping their children doing what they want to do. If preference- 
satisfaction was an intrinsic good, the objector might continue, this would 
not be the case. We can now see why this sort of intervention occurs.
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Parents are more interested in maximising their children's Pl-satisfaction 
than PB-satisfaction. In general the benevolent do want to see others' 
preferences satisfied, but only those which they would retain after 
exposure to logic and the facts.
Perhaps it is enough that the revised preference-utilitarian will 
maximally benefit people's interests. But we might also try to link PU2 
with happiness-utilitarianism. It is fairly obvious that if someone's 
preferences are satisfied they will at least end to be happy. Moreover 
if we insist that it is the agent's rational evaluation that counts the 
two may be closer; it is a commonplace for people to get what they wanted 
yet for them to be unhappy, simply because they ahve found that what is 
really important in life is not what they have aimed for.
It might seem that the last version of preference-utilitarianism - i.e. 
where we take into account what people normally take to be of value - is 
identical to a happiness-version. For it is very close to what Lloyd- 
Thomas thinks is the ethically significant sense of being happy, i.e. 
living up to one's standards for the good life. Clearly one's standards 
for the good life are conceptually close to one's evaluation of what is 
of worth. But important differences will exist between PUI and HU.
Most obviously, there will be some preferences which are so insignificant 
that they cannot be said to contribute to long-term happiness. But this 
does not matter much as these very same preferences will not get a very 
high weighting on PUI. Equally happiness depends on an anticipation that 
one's preferences will be satisfied in the future as much as on their 
actually being satisfied. Finally we would not normally regard someone 
as being happy unless they evaluated their life as being so. Yet it is 
conceivable that someone might have all their preferences satisfied 
yet not be willing to say that he was happy. The concepts of 'happiness' 
and 'preference''satisfaction' differ in that the former has a subjective 
element lacking in the latter.
Consequently it would be going too far to claim that our revised form of 
preference-utilitarianism is identical to happines versions. Nevertheless 
we have in the end described a form of utilitarianism (PUI) which has 
several merits. Happiness-utilitarianism fails because we do not know 
what happiness is. Preference-utilitarianism fails if a preference is 
define behaviouristically because it is mot implausible to suggest that 
the rational agent would want to maximise preference satisfaction in this 
sense. PUI represents a compromise between the two. A preference is 
still something essentially behaviouristic since it is cashable in 
terms of action, yet by allowing for the two (or possibly three) types
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of criticisms of preference we have made it a more plausible criterion 
to evaluate consequences. Thus I hope to have partially filled a gap 
left by Hare in MT, where he fails to enter into the complexities of 
preference-utilitarianism.
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Section III
Chapter VII Moral Conflicts and the Two Levels of Moral Thinking
"Moral Thinking" represent? as advance on Hare's previous work in two 
main ways. As we have already seen he develops his theory concerning the 
constraints the logic of the moral concepts places on moral argument 
into utilitarianism. But possibly more fundamental in his claim that 
there are two levels of moral thinking, the critical and the intuitive.
In this chapter I intend to examine Hare's reasons for thinking that 
there are two levels: in the next, the uses he makes of the distinction.
Hare suggests that the distinction between levels is not entirely 
original. Indeed he suggests that the seeds of it can be seen in Plato's 
distinction between knowledge and right opinion. More striking still is 
the similarity between Hare's system and Mill's: his "secondary principles" 
play the same role as Hare's intuitive principles. There is no doubt 
that historically other philosophers have pointed out the need for both 
a set of moral principles which everyone can have and an intellectual 
procedure for producing and justifying them. Despite this, talk of two 
levels of moral thinking has not passed into our philosophical, let alone 
general vocabulary, so Hare needs to provide arguments to support his view. 
He does this in MT2, where he argues that a consideration of moral conflicts 
necessitates the separation of levels.
Moral conflicts are those occasions when we think that we ought to do 
each of two things, but can in fact only do one. For exmaple I might be 
able to keep a promise or keep an engagement, but not both. Hare thinks 
that this type of case supports his claim in two separate ways. Most 
obviously these cases highlight the need for some decision procedure to 
determine which principle would be acted upon: critical thinking. Hare
argues, does precisely this. Equally importantly, the existence of two 
levels provides an explanation for an otherwise puzzling feature of some 
cases of conflict. We want to say that 'ought' implies 'can' yet in 
some cases we also want to say that we ought to do both fo the acts.
Clearly these contradice each other since in these circumstances we 
cannot do both acts. Hare's theory allows for the possibility that 
'ought' is ambiguous between the two levels. If both 'oughts' are 
retained at the intuitive level, but only one at the critical level, 
then our reaction to cases of moral conflict is accounted for well.
Bernard Williams ("Ethical Consistency", PASS, 1965) thinks he can 
use the existence of moral conflicts to argue against ethical theories 
that suppose one of the 'ought' statements is totally discarded. In 
many cases Williams's claim would be incorrect; for instance, if I can 
either save a life or keep a promise I would hardly still think that
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I ought to keep the promise if I saved the life. I might feel some 
non-moral regret at letting someone down, but would hardly have any doubts 
that I did what I ought (and that had I kept the promise I would have 
done what I ought not to do). But in some cases where significant moral 
weight is attached to both alternatives the situation is rather different. 
Consider Sartre's example of his student, who did not know whether to 
fight for the Free French or look after his mother who might otherwise 
perish. In this sort of tragic case the real moral conflict arises. 
Whichever choice he makes the student will feel serious moral regret.
This regret stems from his feeling that he has a duty to both his family
and his country. In this case Williams claims that in a sense he ought to
do both things is persuasive.
But as Williams recognises this claim leads to severe logical difficulties. 
For we are saying both that
(1) The student ought to fight for the Free French and
(2) - The student ought to stay at home.
But (1) and (2) taken together imply:
(3) The student ought both to fight and stay at home.
Yet he cannot do both, and from 'ought' implies 'can' we obtain:
(4) It is not the case that the student ought both to fight and 
stay at home.
Williams avoids the hopeless position of accepting both (3) and (4) only 
by rejecting the 'agglomeration principle' which allows one to pass 
from "I ought to do A" and "I ought to do B" to "I ought to do A and B".
Unfortunately though, not only does Williams provide no argument for
rejecting it (other than it is the only way he can see out of the 
difficulties) but even if it is rejected Williams's position is difficult. 
It seems that even without the agglomeration principle a contradiction can
be reached by the following route.
(!') I ought to fight
(2*) I ought to stay at home
(3') If I stay at home I cannot fight
(4') I ought not to stay at home [from (1') and (3')]
Clearly (2') and (4') contradict each other.
I-f Williams is right concerning our unwillingness to discard either 
principle then an alternative explanation must be sought. Hare's 
distinction between the two levels of moral thinking fits the bill 
admirably. Hare can say that both (1) and (2) above are principles held
at the intuitive level. Even if one is overridden it is still held -
hence our reluctance to reject it. Our feeling of moral regret is also 
explained. Our moral teachers ensure that we have dispositions to obey 
our intuitive principles, so when we break them we do so with the greatest
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reluctance. The distinction between levels allows us to say that one of 
the acts is- the right one to do even if we do not in general want to 
contradict the overridden principle. We can say that at the critical 
level there is only one thing that we ought to do - but at the intuitive 
level both principles are valid. So Williams' s puzzle is solved without 
tinkering with 'ought' implying 'can' or the agglomeration principle.
But even if one thinks that Williams's puzzle is illusory, the distinction 
between levels is still necessary. Suppose one takes the position that 
moral conflicts are unproblematic in the sense that only one of the 
'ought' statements is kept. Suppose it is argued that the moral regret 
is just an irrational feeling, and that the "tragic" cases, the root cause 
is indecision about what is right (so it is not the case that we think 
we ought to do both: we just are not sure which is right). Even then 
it would be admitted that some decision procedure was essential to 
determine which principle should be overridden. Principles have to be 
simple in order to be learnable, so it is hard to see how they can be 
weighed within the confines of a one-level theory. In addition to the 
principles we need to compare their importance. This in turn means we 
must know what reasons we have for following them and how strong these 
reasons are. For instance to know whether to tell a lie or hurt someone's 
feelings we must have some idea both of the reasons why both of these 
are wrong and the moral weight attached to them. It is no use saying 
that we can appeal to another principle "Tell the truth except where 
this involves hurting people's feelings" because this would inevitably 
lead to principles becoming unmanageably long.
Some might doubt whether these considerations call for two levels of 
moral thinking. They might say that intuitive principles are just rules 
of thumb and should not be confused with proper moral principles. A 
utilitarian might well hold this view, so too might an Aristotelian 
intuitionist who claimed he "just saw" the right thing to do. But 
the dispute would be largely verbal. All would agree that in general 
people are guided by simple moral rules. This simplicity entails the 
possibility of conflict of principles, which in turn leads to the need 
for some means of determining what principle should override which.
In fact the critical level has two roles: not only does it determine
which is right, it also decides why it is right. If it is accepted that 
most of our moral discourse takes place at the intuitive level, it 
follows that the critical level is necessary to settle inevitable 
disputes between intuitive principles and to justify this (and justify 
morality as a whole).
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However, one can grant the need for two levels without assenting to the 
precise form Hare thinks they have. In particular there is no reason why 
utilitarianism should determine what is right at the critical level, nor 
that linguistic intuitions are the only things one can appeal to there.
With regard to the first point a Rawlsian could argue that appeal to 
what rational agents would decide to do under a veil of ignorance should 
determine intuitive principles. Equally a utilitarian could say that 
utilitarianism does hold at the critical level but that it is not 
justified by Hare's argument. This is basically what I take Mill's 
position to be. Whilst of course he did not refer to two levels of 
moral thinking he certainly thought that whilst utilitarianism in a 
sense determined what was right, appeals to the ultimate principle should 
be made not too often. For instance he says:
"It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle 
is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones". And 
"We must remember that only in those cases of conflict between 
secondary principles is it requisite that first principles be appealed to" 
(Utilitarianism).
Mill's position is remarkably similar to Hare's. Both think that 
utilitarianism is the ultimate determinant of what is right (and Mill's 
happiness is closer to preference-utilitarianism than some would think).
Both think that we need secondary principles of the form "Do not lie" 
as appeals to the ultimate principle itself would be counterproductive.
Two major differences remain. Hare argues for the existence of two 
levels independently of utilitarianism existing at the critical level. 
Conversely in effect Mill argues that secondary principles are necessary 
if we assume utilitarianism is true. By the principle of utility itself 
it is better to stick to simple principles than to risk favouring 
oneself and wasting time by doing a cost-benefit analysis each time 
one is contemplating action.
The other difference is more fundamental. Hare thinks that the logic of 
the moral concepts ensures that utilitarianism operates at the critical 
level. Mill's "proof" was, as is well known, rather different; but in 
view of his belief that proof of ultimate principles was impossible the 
value of happiness would in the end have to be an unprovable intuition.
I would suggest that in view of the criticism I have made of Hare's 
method in Section I, a Mill type position is preferable. Utilitarians 
must give reasons why utilitariansim operates at the critical level; 
but as we shall see in the next chapter, utilitarianism becomes a much 
more palatable theory once the distinction between levels has been made.
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Chapter VIII Utilitarianism and Justice
Three types of criticism have prevented utilitarianism from being 
accepted more widely. Least serious is the failure of attempts to prove 
it. If my argument of Section I is correct then Hare's attempt fails, 
as much as others. But I say this is the least serious criticism because 
no competing ethical theory has been proved to the satisfaction of many 
either, and it may well be that ethical theories are not susceptible to 
proof in the normal sense of the word. A more penetrating criticism 
relates to failures by utilitarians to explicate what precisely they mean 
by happiness, or pleasure, or preference-satisfaction or whatever else 
they think should be used to evaluate consequences. In Section II, I 
examined this problem with regard to the satisfaction of preferences, 
and concluded that if it is to be at all plausible one must revise a 
simple behaviouristic concept of preference to one which "Corrects" 
preferences after the agent is made aware of logic and the facts. But 
traditionally perhaps a third type of criticism of utilitarianism has 
been most effective. This is to give circumstances where utilitarianism 
would recommend that we commit some atrocity. The argument is that no 
viable moral theory would entail committing such actions: hence
utilitarianism must be discarded. One of the strongest points of "Moral 
Thinking" is that by using the distinction between the levels of moral 
thinking Hare effectively refutes this argument. In this final chapter 
I intend to examine Hare's defence of utilitarianism, and also look at 
the attempted reconciliation between utilitarianism and justice.
One example of the type of case devised by anti-utilitarians should show 
its superficial attraction and its weakness. Suppose three patients in 
a hospital are on the verge of dying. They suffer from a defective heart, 
liver and kidney respectively. Imagine that a transplant operation is 
technically feasible but sadly no organs are available. At that moment 
a perfectly healthy man walks into the hospital to visit a mildly ill 
friend. The doctors, if they are committed to act-utilitarianism, are 
supposed to kill the visitor and use his organs to .save the three dying 
men. Three lives have been gained at the expense of just one. But of 
course everyone knows that this action would be an awful thing to even 
contemplate: therefore utilitarianism must be wrong. The critic might
even go on to suggest that utilitarianism fails because it does not 
recognise the separateness of people, all of whom must be treated justly 
regardless of the consequences.
Hare's answer begins by asking at what level the objection is made. If 
it is at the critical level then the case can be as fantastic as the critic 
likes. But if it is made at the critical level then appeals to moral
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intuitions are, ruled out. These intuitions serve us well in normal cases 
(if they are good intuitions) but they are the product of critical 
thinking and cannot be used to decide the outcome of critical thinking.
Since utilitarianism operates at the critical level clearly the outcome 
cannot go against utilitarianism. This may seem to make Hare unassailable 
by fiat, but his case is strengthened by the fact that if the cases are 
spelt out in detail it usually becomes clear that the utilitarian 
prescription is not so appalling. Our repugnance at doing the act is 
explained by its being wrong in all circumstances we are at alikely to 
encounter. Our intuitive principles are designed for the world as it is, 
so cannot be expected to cope with outlandish examples. In these fantasies 
serious moral thought reveals that the utilitarian act is not so obviously 
wrong. Consider the example of the three dying men. It is exceedingly 
doubtful whether utilitarianism would endorse the killing. All sorts of 
questions need to be asked. Is there no alternative source of organs? 
(unlikely). Is it certain that the three men will then survive? (again 
unlikely). And will the quality of their life be the same as the visitor's? 
(exceedingly improbable). What about the effects on the visitor's friends 
and the general public's feeling of insecurity? But the critic could say 
that in this case all these questions could be answered his way. The visitor 
had no friends, three men were certain to live long and healthy lives, the 
operation would be kept secret. But if this really is the case (and now 
the case is so fantastic that we really must forget our preconceived moral 
principles), would killing the man be the wrong act? The example has been 
cooked so that only one calculation is relevant: three lives against one.
Imagine you had a 25% chance of being any of the four people. Do you 
prescribe that one lives of three? The anti-utilitarians make their criticism 
plausible only because they do not fill in the details of the cases; if 
they do, it becomes clear either that the act is not prescribed by 
utilitarianism or that it may be the better of two acts.
But the objector has an alternative to resorting to critical thinking.
He can confine his objection to the intuitive level in which case he can 
appeal to his and his audience's moral intuitions. But then he is not 
allowed to use "cooked" fantastic cases. Hare says he has yet to see 
one such case. Moreover, the objector would have to provide a case where 
we do not have conflicting intuitions - for if we did critical thinking 
would have to be done anyway.
To be consistent Hare has to hold that in normal situations our intuitive 
principles - that is our feelings about what rights people have, what is 
just, what is fair, etc. , are not incompatible with utilitarianism.
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But in fact he advances a stronger claim: namely that these can all
be derived from utilitarianism. In this way utilitarianism and 
deontological theories are in a sense reconciled; the former applies 
to critical thinking and the latter to intuitive thinking. Hare does 
not argue for utilitarianism being used to derive these principles 
separately: if his argument examined in Section I is correct, then he
does not need to. But he does think that an appeal to critical thinking 
would justify many of the rights, rules of justice, etc. that we think 
we have. Thus consider the question of whether or not courts should punish 
innocent men. The effect of such actions would in all probability be to 
undermine confidence in the entire legal system; so utility dictates 
that there be a principle of justice such that only the guilty are punished. 
Similarly, it is plausible to argue that an appeal to what people prefer 
ensures such rights as the right to freedom of speech, and to fair treatment. 
But critical thinking would not endorse all rules of justice; it would 
almost certainly rule out some principles of justice in favour of others 
(e.g. a principle of the type "an eye for an eye" would be rejected).
Another consequence of Hare's position is that what rights and rules of 
justice we ought to have is contingent upon our circumstances - in 
particular upon human nature. For example, in considering the distribution 
of money received from the sale of a product, facts, concerning human 
nature appear relevant. Suppose for the sake of argument that circumstances 
are such that equality and efficiency must conflict - i.e. if all labour 
is paid the same wage the total national income is reduced. Now consider 
two alternative possible worlds. In the first people tend to be envious 
and there is a high diminishing marginal utility of money. Here it seems 
a principle like "the benefits ought to be shared equally" is called for. 
Contrast this with a world where there is no envy and constant marginal 
utility of money. Clearly in these circumstances the case for differential 
rates of pay is great. Critical thinking might well suggest a right for 
equal pay in the first world but not the second. It seems very plausible 
to suggest that differences in the facts shall affect differences in 
principles in this way. However, it seems to me that Hare's case for 
thinking that the distinction between levels provides for a degree of 
utilitarianism is stronger than its use in reconciling the two types 
of theory.
Even if it is the case that in practice Hare's theory means people will 
respect rights and rules of justice this would hardly satisfy the 
deontologist. He would want to claim that utilitarianism was not even 
theoretically valid. Moreover it would hardly satisfy the holder of some
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principle which critical thinking did not recommend. Suppose that 
workers are terribly exploited in terms of the differential between 
the value of their wages and what they produce. Many would argue that 
their wages should be increased, whatever the consequences. A believer 
in abstract notions of justice might well hold this view. Yet if the 
workers are quite happy with their situation, and if an increase in wages 
would reduce efficiency, utilitarianism would suggest the opposite. At 
best then Hare's theory only allows for partial compatibility.
There is also a quite different way in which Hare's theory might be 
said to go against our non-utilitarian principles. rt could well be 
that critical thinking will favour those who are selfish as opposed to 
those who are moral; which is not only patently unfair, but also will 
in itself provide an incentive for not doing critical thinking or being 
moral. Imagine a man can visit either but not both of two sickly 
relatives in hospital on a particular day.. Objectively there is little 
to choose between them. They both very much would like to see him and 
he could say the same comforting words. However, one is a strongly 
assertive, selfish person, who can see no further than his own immediate 
wishes, the other a considerate type. In view of this, the former 
character may be represented as having a stronger preference than the 
latter (who will understand that his younger relative has other 
obligations). Here utilitarianism requires him visiting the selfish man. 
Yet this seems to be grossly unfair; why should someone benefit by 
virtue of their moral defects? This example contains elements of 
Nozick's utility monster and the argument from evil desires, but is 
more realistic than either. In general it seems that everyone who adjusts 
his preferences in accordance with the general good will have weaker 
selfish preferences and will tend to have his wishes frustrated when 
another moral thinker applies critical thinking.
Aside from the theoretical difficulties, there may also be practical 
difficulties in the reconciliation. Hare wants to suggest that both 
principles of justice and utilitarianism are sound. Whilst this position 
is quite coherent (the former being general and amendable by the latter 
in some particular cases) it is difficult to see how it would work in 
practice. Hare says that omniscient, impartial archangels would never 
resort to the intuitive level, but humans should rarely depart from it.
He thinks that psychologically we will have great difficulty in breaking 
our intuitive principles if we are well brought up. He also distinguishes 
between good men and the right action. A good man might not always do 
the right action, since the intuitive principles are so well-entrenched 
in him that even in the rare cases where he ought to go against them
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(like our doctors case before) he will not be able to bring himself to 
do so. But this makes his position rather close to Dworkin's view 
(Taking Rights Seriously) that rights are trumps played by the individual 
against appeals to the general good. So if intuitive principles are 
seldom departed from a Harean might not be very utilitarian in practice.
On the other hand, Hare also holds that one should do some critical 
thinking whenever intuitive principles conflict with each other. But in 
almost all cases where we are faced with a serious moral dilemma our 
moral intuitions conflict: indeed it is this feature that makes for a
dilemma. Yet if we are doing critical thinking in these cases Hare can 
hardly claim that rules of justice or rights have the sanctity intuitionists 
think they have. This is no small problem for Hare. By hedging on this 
issue Hare is trying to have his cake and eat it. Utilitarians and 
their opponents differ on the issue of how often appeals to utility 
or the general good should override individuals' rights (if at all).
The distinction between levels cannot in itself settle this question.
In practice each moral debate concerns whether or not an admittedly 
good moral principle shall be overridden in some particular set of 
circumstances. Hare can go either of two ways. He can either say that 
whenever moral conflicts occur criticl thinking must take place, in 
which case he will act like a utilitarian - or else that because of our 
insufficient knowledge, partiality, etc. we should hardly ever do critical 
thinking (except to frame principles) - in which case we would act like 
Dworkinites. Hare cannot please both camps at the same time since there 
is a substantial measure of disagreement. To illustrate the dilemma 
consider the following:
Suppose the government has to decide what to do with a village where 
radioactive material has been released with a massive risk of lethal 
contamination to the rest of the country. Now it might be that critical 
thinking would conclude that the village should be obliterated to remove 
the risk of a much greater disaster occurring. The question is, if the 
government have read Hare, what will they do? If they stick to the 
intuitive principles they could not possibly destroy the village and 
its inhabitants; yet critical thinking might well prescribe this course 
of action. In practice then it is by no means clear that even a two 
level moral theory can please both utilitarians and non-utilitarians 
alike.
So it would seem that -the distinction between levels, powerful as it is, 
cannot do all that Hare intends for it. Its most notable achievement is 
to formalise Mill's suggestion that by its own application the ultimate 
principle should not be appealed to directly too frequently. Utility 
(or preference-satisfaction) itself requires "secondary" or "intuitive"
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principles. This allows for a degree of reconciliation between 
utilitarianism and opposing theories. A two-tier utilitarianism 
does not deny the need for principles, nor the need for people to 
treat these principles as sacrosanct. But disagreement remains.
Hare gives utilitarianism a theoretical primacy deontolegists would 
agree with. Furthermore, in practice, it is difficult to see how 
both sets of protagonists can be pleased. But whilst Hare's 
distinction between levels does not end disagreement between 
utilitarians and their opponents, it does make utilitarianism a much 
more plausible theory.
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Chapter IX Conclusion
As I remarked at the outset, "Moral Thinking" is a most ambitious work.
It contains two important claims. First, that there are two levels of 
moral thinking and second, that the logic of the moral concepts constrains 
the moral agent into issuing utilitarian prescriptions. Moreover, these 
two claims, were they correct, would enhance each other. There being two 
levels of moral thinking makes utilitarianism all the more plausible and 
the argument for utilitarianism provides the decision procedure to operate 
at the critical level.
In Section I , I provided several arguments against Hare's argument for
utilitarianism. In view of its defects - and in particular the falseness 
of prescriptivity and the inefficiency of appeals to linguistic intuitions - 
I do not see much prospect of this argument being patched up. But in 
Section III we saw that a two-tier utilitarianism will be more attractive 
than a one-level theory. In Section II a concept of preference was 
sketched, such that it is plausible to argue that the prudent agent will 
seek to maximise his own preference-satisfaction over time.
What is needed is an argument giving reasons why this revised preference- 
utilitarianism operates at the critical level. As I have said, I do not 
see how such a proposition could be proved. But perhaps the following is 
a feasible approach: It could be suggested that the rational, self-
interested agent will atempt to maximise his own preference-satisfaction. 
The step from prudence to morality requires that we impartially seek to 
maximise everyone's preference-satisfaction.
If this argument is to work, at least three major problems have to be 
faced. First, much fuller argument has to be given as to why it is 
rational for the self-interested man to maximise his own preference- 
satisfaction. Secondly, conclusive arguments must be made against the
idealist who thinks that the object as well as the strength of preferences
matters. Finally, much has to be said of how the two-tier utilitarianism 
will work in practice. I suggest that all these questions merit 
investigation.
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